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ABSTRACT
In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., the U.S.
Supreme Court overruled its 1911 precedent declaring vertical
minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) to be per se illegal. The
Leegin Court held that the practice should instead be examined on
a case-by-case basis under antitrust's rule of reason. The Court
further exhorted the lower courts to craft a "structured"rule of reason
for evaluating RPM. This Article critiques six proposed approaches
for evaluating minimum RPM and offers an alternative approach.
The six approaches critiqued are: (1) the Brandeisian, unstructured
rule of reason; (2) Judge Posner's rule of per se legality; (3) the
approach advocated by twenty-seven states in the recent Nine West
case; (4) the approach adopted by the Federal Trade Commission in
that case; (5) the approach advocated by economists William
Comanor and F.M. Scherer; and (6) the approach proposed in the
Areeda & Hovenkamp Antitrust Law treatise. Finding each of these
approaches deficient, this Article proposes an alternative evaluative
approach that harnesses economic learning and allocates proof
burdens in a manner that minimizes the sum of decision and error
costs, thereby maximizing the net social benefits of RPM regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,1 marked the end of an era in antitrust.
Leegin overruled the Court's 1911 Dr. Miles decision,2 which had
established that minimum vertical resale price maintenance
(RPM)-the fixing of minimum downstream prices by upstream
firms 3-is per se unreasonable.4 Leegin's holding that instances of
RPM must instead be evaluated under antitrust's rule of reason5
was no great surprise. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that
per se illegality is reserved for restraints of trade that are always or
almost always anticompetitive.' Although some of the vast commen-
tary on RPM highlights the practice's anticompetitive potential,v
numerous economists have demonstrated that RPM may provide
important procompetitive benefits.8 Thus, one thing is clear in the
1. 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
2. Id. at 2710 (overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911)).
3. For purposes of simplicity, this Article conceives of minimum RPM in terms of a
simple two-level distribution scheme in which the manufacturer sets the prices charged by
retailers. The existence of intermediate distributors (wholesalers, etc.) would not significantly
alter the analysis, which would generally apply anytime an upstream firm sets the prices
charged by a downstream distributor.
4. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 400-01.
5. See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2710.
6. See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (noting that
resort to per se rules is confined to restraints '"that would always or almost always tend to
restrict competition and decrease output"' (quoting Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac.
Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1984))).
7. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIALMARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 541-48 (3d ed. 1990); William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical
Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983, 984 (1985); Warren
S. Grimes, The Seven Myths of Vertical Price Fixing: The Politics and Economics of a Century-
Long Debate, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (1992); Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters:
The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1487
(1983); F.M. Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687,697 (1983).
8. See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price
Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 848 (1955); David A. Butz, Vertical Price Controls with
Uncertain Demand, 40 J.L. & ECON. 433, 434-36 (1997); Raymond Deneckere, Howard P.
Marvel & James Peck, Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as
Destructive Competition, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 619, 620 (1997); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M.
Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265, 295-
96 (1988); Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, The Welfare Effects of Resale Price
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academic literature on RPM: the practice is, at worst, a "mixed bag"
in terms of competitive effects. Mixed bags should not be deemed
unreasonable per se.9
While the academic literature is replete with accounts of RPM's
competitive effects, there is little commentary addressing exactly
how courts should go about judging the "reasonableness" of any
particular instance of RPM. This makes sense, of course, because
Dr. Miles precluded courts from inquiring into the reasonableness
of specific RPM agreements, and such commentary would have
therefore been rather pointless. 10 But in the post-Leegin era, in the
face of a proliferation of RPM arrangements," courts must develop
means of distinguishing pro- from anticompetitive RPM agreements.
Indeed, the Leegin Court expressly contemplated that the lower
courts would craft a structured approach for sorting instances of
RPM. It explained:
As courts gain experience considering the effects of these [RPM]
restraints by applying the rule of reason over the course of
decisions, they can establish the litigation structure to ensure
the rule operates to eliminate anticompetitive restraints from
the market and to provide more guidance to businesses. Courts
can, for example, devise rules over time for offering proof, or
even presumptions where justified, to make the rule of reason a
fair and efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive restraints and
to promote procompetitive ones.
12
This Article aims to assist courts with this assignment by
proposing a structured rule of reason for evaluating the legality of
Maintenance, 28 J.L. & ECON. 363, 371 (1985); Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty,
Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346, 347 (1984); Lester
G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 90-92 (1960).
9. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
10. There is one notable pre-Leegin proposal for a structured rule of reason, which is set
forth in the Antitrust Law treatise. See 8 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW 1633, at 328-39 (2d ed. 2004). The treatise authors likely included this
thorough proposal, despite the governing per se rule, to illustrate that rule of reason
treatment is workable and would be superior to per se treatment. For a summary and critique
of this treatise's laudable and visionary analysis, see infra Part II.E.
11. See Joseph Pereira, Price-Fixing Makes Comeback After Supreme Court Ruling, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 18, 2008, at Al (reporting a marked increase in RPM following Leegin).
12. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007).
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RPM agreements. Part I lays the foundation by summarizing the
economic learning on RPM's competitive effects. Part II then
describes and critiques six approaches that have been proposed for
evaluating the legality of specific instances of RPM. Part III
proposes an alternative evaluative approach. Under this approach,
a party challenging an instance of RPM could prevail only if it either
(1) produced convincing evidence that the RPM resulted in an
output reduction that could not be attributed to another cause or (2)
both demonstrated the existence of all the prerequisites to one of
RPM's potential anticompetitive harms and rebutted any claim that
the RPM was imposed as the most efficient means of securing a
procompetitive end. The proposed approach would maximize the net
benefits of RPM regulation by minimizing the sum of decision costs
and error costs.
I. RPM AND COMPETITION
Crafting a rational scheme for separating pro- from anticom-
petitive instances of RPM requires an understanding of how RPM
may enhance or diminish competition. We thus begin with a
consideration of RPM's competitive effects. Possible anticompetitive
harms, examined in Part I.A, include the facilitation of collusion by
dealers and manufacturers and the erection of barriers to entry by
manufacturers. 3 Potential procompetitive benefits, the focus of Part
13. RPM has also been accused of causing certain "noncompetition" harms. The Dr. Miles
Court itself, for example, focused primarily on RPM's creation of a restraint on alienation and
its interference with dealer freedom. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220
U.S. 373, 404 (1911) ("But because a manufacturer is not bound to make or sell, it does not
follow that in case of sales actually made he may impose upon purchasers every sort of
restriction. Thus a general restraint upon alienation is ordinarily invalid."); id. at 407-08
(observing that a manufacturer's interest in RPM is not "one which he is entitled to secure by
agreements restricting the freedom of trade on the part of dealers who own what they sell").
Neither of these noncompetition concerns justifies restricting the use of RPM. The doctrine
disfavoring restraints on alienation would not reach RPM. As the Leegin Court observed, 'The
general restraint on alienation, especially in the age when then-Justice Hughes used the
term, tended to evoke policy concerns extraneous to the question that controls here. Usually
associated with land, not chattels, the rule arose from restrictions removing real property
from the stream of commerce for generations." Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2714. Moreover, the
common law doctrine disfavoring restraints on alienation was not absolute; such restraints
were permitted if they were reasonable and necessary to facilitate efficiency enhancing
transactions. See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 Peere Wins. 181, 184 (Ch. 1711). To the extent RPM
enhances distributional efficiency, it would pass muster even if it came within the ambit of
1942 [Vol. 50:1937
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I.B, include the enhancement of distributional efficiency, the
facilitation of entry into the upstream market, and the facilitation
of the marketing of products for which consumer demand is
uncertain.
A. Potential Anticompetitive Harms
RPM's potential anticompetitive harms result from its ability to
facilitate collusion and to foreclose new entrants from available
marketing outlets. Collusion, which the Supreme Court has dubbed
"the supreme evil of antitrust,"14 is, fortunately enough, difficult to
accomplish. 5 First, the parties to any collusive arrangement must
reach an understanding on how they will limit competition amongst
themselves. For example, if the collusive agreement is price fixing,
what price will be charged? 6 Agreements of this sort among
multiple parties are always a challenge to negotiate, and, because
collusion is generally illegal,' 7 the parties to any cartel must do so
in a clandestine fashion. In addition, the parties to a cartel must
somehow police it-that is, they must monitor their coconspirators'
compliance with the agreed-upon terms and punish violators.
Secretly policing illegal, heavily sanctioned agreements not to
compete can be quite difficult.
RPM may disrupt this fortuitous state of affairs by making
collusion easier for both dealers and manufacturers. As Part I.A.1
explains, RPM may facilitate collusion at the dealer level by
assisting with both the establishment and the enforcement of a price
the traditional rule limiting restraints on alienation.
The argument that RPM improperly restricts dealer freedom also fails. Manufacturers, who
typically want their dealers to be as effective as possible, routinely dictate aspects of the
dealers' operations. The law has assumed most of those intrusions on dealer freedom to be
valid, see 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1609, at 114-15, and limiting manu-
facturers' freedom to impose such restrictions would simply encourage vertical integration
into distribution-an outcome that certainly would not be in the interest of dealers. Thus, a
mere infringement on dealer autonomy cannot justify restricting RPM.
14. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
15. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 727 (1988) ("Cartels are
neither easy to form nor easy to maintain.").
16. Id. ("Uncertainty over the terms of the cartel, particularly the prices to be charged in
the future, obstructs both formation and adherence by making cheating easier.").
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (prohibiting collusive agreements among competitors).
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fixing agreement. Part I.A.2 considers how RPM may facilitate the
enforcement of manufacturer-level collusive agreements. Finally,
Part I.A.3 considers how manufacturers may employ RPM as an
exclusionary device aimed at thwarting competition from new
entrants in the manufacturing market.
1. Facilitating Dealer Collusion
Dealers can avoid the difficulty of secretly negotiating a fixed
supracompetitive resale price for a product if they can convince the
manufacturer of that product to require all dealers to charge such
a price. They may, for example, complain to the manufacturer-
either individually, as a group, or via some trade association-about
discounting dealers that are somehow injuring brand equity. The
manufacturer might then respond to their complaints by setting
minimum resale prices and thereby essentially establishing the
retailer cartel. In addition, the manufacturer, which is in constant
contact with its dealers and whose interactions with the competing
dealers do not typically raise red flags, may take the lead in
enforcing the price fixing agreement by punishing (that is, refusing
to supply to) dealers that diverge from the fixed price.' 8 RPM thus
may permit colluding retailers to overcome the two main hurdles to
a price fixing conspiracy: establishment and enforcement.
Of course, manufacturers must agree to participate in this sort of
scheme, and it is not immediately obvious why they would do so.
The retail markup-the difference between the price the manufac-
turer collects from the retailer and the price the retailer charges the
end user consumer-is the cost the manufacturer must incur to
distribute its goods via retailers.19 A manufacturer would presum-
ably seek to keep that cost as low as possible and would thus refuse
retailer requests to impose minimum RPM (unless the guaranteed
retail markup somehow enhanced consumer demand for the manu-
facturer's products, in which case the RPM would be efficiency
18. For example, evidence suggests that the RPM at issue in Dr. Miles was procured by
retail dealers seeking to enlist manufacturer assistance in enforcing their retailer-level cartel.
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 186 (2005)
("Retail druggists were fixing prices and using manufacturers as their 'enforcer.').
19. If the manufacturer were to directly distribute its goods to consumers, it could charge
the higher consumer price itself, thereby pocketing any retail markup.
1944 [Vol. 50:1937
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enhancing).2 ° In theory, though, a manufacturer might accede to
RPM demands from dealers or groups of dealers that possess
market power in the market for retail distribution. If, for example,
a trade association representing a majority of available retail outlets
in a geographic market demanded on behalf of its members that a
manufacturer set minimum resale prices for its goods, and if the
manufacturer could not easily integrate forward into retail distribu-
tion in the relevant geographic market, the manufacturer might
give in to the association's demands.2 Similarly, dealers might
exercise their collective power in an unconcerted manner if a
number of prominent dealers, representing a substantial percentage
of available retail outlets in an area, independently demanded
imposition of RPM.22 Even the pressure of a single dealer could
conceivably motivate a manufacturer to impose RPM if the dealer
represented a large percentage of available marketing outlets, and
switching to other dealers or forward integration into retailing was
likely to prove costly.
23
2. Facilitating Manufacturer Collusion
Whereas RPM can, at least in theory, assist with both the
establishment and the enforcement of dealer-level collusion, the
theories of anticompetitive harm based on facilitation of manufac-
turer coordination focus only on RPM's ability to enforce pre-
established manufacturer-level cartels. In theory, RPM can assist
with the enforcement of such cartels in two ways. First, it may
reduce cheating by the manufacturers by reducing both the
likelihood that dealers will request discounts and the manufactur-
ers' expected benefits from granting such requests. In addition, it
may increase the detectability of any cheating that does occur.
20. For a discussion of this possibility, see infra Part I.B. 1.
21. 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1604dl, at 46 (discussing exercise of dealer
power via trade associations).
22. Id. at 46-47 (explaining how dealers could make independent demands in a manner
that would preclude an inference of conspiracy).
23. Id. 1604d2, at 47-48 (discussing how a powerful individual dealer could successfully
demand RPM).
19452009]
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a. Reducing Incentives To Cheat
The more intense the price competition faced by dealers, the more
likely it is that they will petition their manufacturers for price
cuts. Moreover, if price competition at the dealer level is intense
so that failure to grant a requested discount may result in a
dealer's failure or abandonment of the manufacturer's brand, a
manufacturer may be particularly inclined to grant the discount
request.24 If one manufacturer caves in to dealer pressure to reduce
dealer prices from supracompetitive levels, competing manufactur-
ers are likely to follow suit, and a manufacturer-level cartel will
unravel. Coordinating manufacturers could reduce this risk by each
imposing RPM so as to prevent dealer initiated price competition
and the consequent demands for dealer price cuts.25
In addition, RPM may reduce the benefit a manufacturer gains
from acquiescing to demands for discounts. In most cartels, each
participant faces a constant temptation to usurp sales from its
coconspirators by lowering its price from the fixed level.26 Such
cheating has caused many a cartel to unravel. But when manufac-
turers that have coordinated on the price they charge dealers
also employ RPM, any price break a cheating manufacturer grants
its dealers cannot be passed along to consumers in the form of
lower retail prices and is thus unlikely to enhance appreciably the
24. The manufacturer may reason that it will lose less from granting the discount than
from losing the dealer. See id. 1606c, at 85.
25. Id. at 85-86. As an example of price competition at the dealer level leading to price
cuts at the manufacturer level, Areeda and Hovenkamp point to gasoline price wars, in which
intense dealer-level competition frequently leads to manufacturer discounts in the form of
"temporary competitive allowance[s]." Id. at 86.
26. See Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, The Economics of Resale Price Maintenance,
in 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND PoucY 1841, 1846 (Wayne D. Collins ed., 2008) ("Once
cartelists reach an agreement to raise prices, each of them has a strong incentive to cheat on
that agreement by secretly cutting price and expanding output.").
1946 [Vol. 50:1937
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cheating manufacturer's total sales.27 RPM may therefore reduce
the benefit of cheating on a manufacturer-level cartel.
b. Making Cheating More Visible
RPM may also facilitate a manufacturer-level cartel by making
cheating more detectable. Manufacturers are more likely to diverge
from coordinated prices if they can keep their price cuts a secret.
Because the price any manufacturer charges particular dealers is
normally private, maintaining such secrecy might not be especially
difficult. By employing RPM to set retail prices, which are typically
public, manufacturers can better detect reductions on the prices
charged dealers.28 Dealers who are given price reductions may
respond by lowering their retail prices somewhat below the fixed
level. Absent RPM, fluctuation in retail prices might result from
retailers' independently varying their margins. With industry-wide
RPM, however, a drop in the retail price of one brand gives rise to
an inference that the manufacturer of that brand has discounted to
27. See RiCHARDA. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 88 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that a manufacturer
subject to RPM "will gain no additional sales by granting a secret discount to a dealer except
insofar as the discount will operate as a bribe to induce the dealer to push the supplier's
brand over that of competing brands"). Of course, even if retailers cannot pass along price cuts
to consumers, manufacturers would still seem to have an incentive to cheat on a conspiracy
fixing the prices charged to retailers because doing so could lead retailers to switch purchases
from the complying manufacturers to the cheating ones. Still, RPM may reduce, though
perhaps not eliminate, the temptation to cheat. Although a cheating manufacturer might
benefit from more dealer purchases (offset by lower purchases from competing
manufacturers), the incremental gain in purchases would not be as great as if total sales were
increased by lower prices to end-user consumers. Moreover, manufacturer cheating leading
to higher dealer purchases from the cheater and lower dealer purchases from other
manufacturers is likely to be detected. If a dealer cuts back on its purchases from noncheating
suppliers, they are likely to inquire as to the reason for the cutback, so the cheating
manufacturer likely will be detected. In addition, if manufacturers sell through single-brand
dealers and the manufacturers have set resale prices the dealers may charge, then there is
little incentive for the manufacturers to cheat on the price they charge the dealers. Doing so
will not increase total sales to consumers (so retailers will not have any need to buy more in
response to a lower price; manufacturers will just give away some of their profits to retailers).
Also, it may be difficult for dealers to switch to the manufacturers who have lowered prices
to dealers. The price reductions are necessarily secret, so other dealers will not know about
them, and there may be high "brand switching" costs for dealers who handle only one brand
of a product.
28. See id. at 172 ("[C]olluding manufacturers may wish to fix retail rather than just
wholesale prices ... in order to make it easier to detect cheating, the retail price being more
easily ascertained than the wholesale price.").
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its dealers or, at a minimum, has failed to enforce its RPM policy.29
In either case, some sort of reprimand is in order. In short, RPM
may facilitate the policing of manufacturer-level price coordination
by increasing the visibility or transparency of wholesale prices. °
There are, however, reasons to doubt that manufacturers would
often employ RPM to strengthen coordination by enhancing price
transparency. Any RPM that increases dealer margins (as all
minimum RPM will do unless it provides for a retail markup that
precisely mirrors the incremental cost of retailing) raises the cost
manufacturers pay for distribution.31 Manufacturers thus will
impose RPM to shore up manufacturer coordination only if the
incremental collusive gains the RPM can be expected to provide
exceed its obvious costs. 32 The incremental gains created by RPM's
"wholesale price-revealing' function are probably minimal. First, for
goods sold through multibrand retailers, coordinating manufactur-
ers could learn of other manufacturers' price cuts by communicating
with the retailers, with whom the noncheating manufacturers have
regular contact; this implies that many instances of manufacturer
cheating could be discovered even without costly RPM." For goods
sold through single-brand retailers, it would not be possible to learn
of manufacturer price cuts from the retailers. But such goods tend
to be highly differentiated, and that differentiation renders price
coordination, particularly of the tacit variety, quite difficult and
rather unlikely.34 Moreover, the sort of cheating that is likely to dis-
rupt coordinated manufacturer pricing would be relatively wide-
spread discounts to dealers representing a significant share of sales
29. See Elzinga & Mills, supra note 26, at 1847.
30. See generally 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1606e, at 88-91.
31. Cf. POSNER, supra note 27, at 88 (observing that RPMs enhancement of dealer
margins "will be a pure windfall to the dealer").
32. Id.
33. See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1606e2, at 89 ("[U]nless dealers handle
only a single brand, each manufacturer can learn rival wholesale prices from the multi-brand
dealers who buy from them and talk to all of them. Their wholesale prices are thus visible
enough for monitoring express or tacit coordination without regard to resale price
maintenance."). For reasons they do not state, Areeda and Hovenkamp conclude that this
argument is "not persuasive." Id.
34. See Elzinga & Mills, supra note 26, at 1847 ("Product differentiation engenders all
kinds of nonprice competition among the cartel members that would be difficult for a cartel
to squash, especially in an environment where contracts cannot be enforced in a court of
law.").
1948 [Vol. 50:1937
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of the relevant product; the occasional discount to one or a few
smaller dealers would be far less likely to disturb the coordination.
The relatively widespread discounts, though, would likely be de-
tectable by the other price-coordinating manufacturers even without
RPM.35 Thus, it is not clear that RPM, which is undoubtedly costly
to manufacturers, provides sufficient "collusive benefit" to justify its
use as a wholesale price revealing mechanism.
3. RPM-Augmented Foreclosure
The Leegin Court acknowledged a third anticompetitive harm
that may result from instances of RPM: in theory at least, RPM
might facilitate the foreclosure of nondominant brands, particularly
those of new entrants, from a dominant manufacturer's market. 6
Imposition of RPM permits a manufacturer to control its dealer's
profit margins.3 7 A dominant manufacturer might implicitly bargain
with its dealers that it will impose RPM to guarantee them an
attractive profit margin on its products in exchange for their refusal
to distribute (or promote) the brands of competitors and/or new
entrants. 8 If dealers choose not to jeopardize their attractive RPM-
protected profit margins by handling (or promoting) other brands,
competing manufacturers and new entrants may find themselves
foreclosed from marketing outlets or, at a minimum, relegated to
less desirable channels of distribution. Thus, RPM might be "exclu-
sionary" in that it causes market foreclosure or raises rivals' costs.3
35. See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1606e2, at 89 ("[The widespread
reductions on a single brand that would trouble [coordinating manufacturers] would
presumably be attributed to a cut in the wholesale price.").
36. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2007) ("A
manufacturer with market power ... might use resale price maintenance to give retailers an
incentive not to sell the products of smaller rivals or new entrants." (citing Marvel &
McCafferty, The Welfare Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, supra note 8, at 366-68)).
37. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
38. See Elzinga & Mills, supra note 26, at 1847 (noting that RPM "might facilitate an
implicit contract between the manufacturer and [its] retailers of the following nature. The
manufacturer ensures retailers of an attractive profit margin on sales of its own brand in
exchange for their refusing to take on the distribution of competing brands, including brands
offered by new entrants.").
39. A number of business practices, such as exclusive dealing and tying, receive antitrust
scrutiny because of their ability to foreclose rivals from marketing outlets. See generally
HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 198-206. Foreclosure arguments are particularly strong when
cast in terms of "raising rivals' costs" of distribution. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
2009] 1949
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Of course, for such exclusionary effect to occur, the RPM agree-
ments must cover a sufficiently large portion of available marketing
outlets; if competitors have access to sufficiently attractive alterna-
tive distribution channels, there can be no competitive harm. RPM
by a nondominant manufacturer, whose market share would not be
large enough for the RPM to cause substantial foreclosure, could not
have this anticompetitive effect.40 Moreover, as explained below,
RPM may actually facilitate new entry by providing entrants with
a means to reward dealers that will carry the entrants' untested
products.4'
B. Potential Procompetitive Benefits
Although RPM may, at least in theory, harm consumers by
reducing competition, it may also benefit consumers by enhancing
competition among different brands of a product. Specifically, it may
increase interbrand competition by enhancing manufacturers' dis-
tributional efficiency, facilitating entry by new manufacturers, and
increasing product offerings for which there is uncertain consumer
demand.
1. Enhancing Distributional Efficiency
To see how RPM may enhance the efficiency of the distributional
process, consider how it provides a sort of "middle ground" vertical
integration. As Ronald Coase famously observed, the inputs a firm
uses in producing its end products may be purchased on a market
or produced internally, and a firm will opt for internal production
(in other words, will "vertically integrate" into input-production)
when the inevitable efficiency loss from allocating productive
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 10.9a2, at 436-37 (3d ed.
2005) ("Many of the foreclosure theories of exclusive dealing become more robust if one views
them, not as excluding rivals from a market altogether, but as raising rivals' costs by
relegating them to inferior distribution channels.").
40. See Elzinga & Mills, supra note 26, at 1847 ("This [RPM-augmented foreclosure]
theory cannot apply where manufacturer competitors and entrants retain access to the
market via competing retailers or alternative channels of distribution. Nor can it apply where
the manufacturer using RPM does not control a large share of the relevant market in spite
of using this practice.").
41. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
1950 [Vol. 50:1937
DR. MILES IS DEAD. NOW WHAT?
resources via managerial fiat rather than market forces42 is less
than the transaction costs of acquiring the input on the market.4"
Vertical integration, then, is generally an efficiency enhancing
strategy.
Because the process of getting one's products to end users is
ultimately an input, manufacturers always confront a "make or buy"
decision with respect to distribution services. Each manufacturer
may "buy" distribution services by selling at a discount to distribu-
tion specialists, who will then resell at a markup to consumers.44
Alternatively, the manufacturer may "make" distribution services
by expanding its operations to include retail sales to end-user
consumers. As Coase explained, the manufacturer's decision of
whether to bring distribution services within the firm depends on
the relative cost of these two options, costs which change with
technological development.45
Both options involve trade-offs for the manufacturer. The upside
of a "buy" approach is that the professional distributor can special-
ize in distribution services (for example, sales to end-user consum-
ers in the case of retail distributors) and can thus achieve some
productive efficiencies. The downside is that the distributor may
shirk (for example, a multibrand retailer may not adequately
promote the manufacturer's brand). As for the "make" decision, the
upside is that the manufacturer can better control how much effort
is put into promoting its products. The downside is that the manu-
facturer, which does not specialize in distribution, may be less
efficient at distributing its products to end-users in a manner that
makes the products most attractive and thus maximizes total sales.
Selling to distributors subject to minimum RPM agreements
provides a "middle ground" means by which a manufacturer may
42. On the relative inefficiency of resource allocation by centralized planning versus
resource allocation via market exchanges guided by prices, see generally F. A. Hayek, The Use
of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1935).
43. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONOMICA 386, 394-95 (1937).
44. The "price" the manufacturer pays for this service is the difference between the price
it charges the initial reseller and the higher price ultimately charged to consumers, a price
it could collect if it provided distribution services itself.
45. Coase, supra note 43, at 394-97; see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 85-86 (1985);
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS,
A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION 114 (1975).
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secure most of the benefits and avoid many of the costs of both the
buy and make options. Because the manufacturer is selling its
products to middlemen, it can take advantage of their superior
distribution and product promotion skills. RPM, though, allows the
manufacturer to retain some control over the distribution process
and thus to minimize the downside of buying distribution services.
In particular, the use of RPM enables manufacturers to encourage
point of sale services that could be subject to free riding46 and to
enforce unspecified "agreements" about how products will be
distributed.47 These benefits explain the odd fact that many
manufacturers voluntarily impose minimum RPM, even though
doing so effectively raises the retail markup, which is ultimately the
price the manufacturers are paying for distribution services.48
a. Encouraging Retail Services by Eliminating Free Riders
The demand for a manufacturer's product is frequently affected
by the retail services that accompany that product.49 Such services
may include, among other things: presale display and demonstra-
tion; the provision of product-specific information, such as training
in how to use the product; convenient store hours; assurance of
adequate inventory; postsale service; a quality or prestige stamp
that comes from the retailer's reputation as certifier of high quality
products; ° comfortable retail facilities; and other shopping ameni-
ties.5 Because customers value retail services, the provision of more
and better services enhances consumer demand. Indeed, these
desirable point of sale services may leave consumers better off even
if they result in higher consumer prices. Provision of the services is
efficient when the cost of the services is less than the value they
create.
46. See discussion infra Part I.B.l.a.
47. See discussion infra Part I.B.l.b.
48. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
49. See generally Elzinga & Mills, supra note 26, at 1842 (discussing retail services that
may enhance demand for a supplier's products).
50. Retailers known for carrying high-quality merchandise provide what has been called
a "quality certification" service to manufacturers. See generally Marvel & McCafferty, Resale
Price Maintenance and Quality Certification, supra note 8.
51. See id.
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To the extent point of sale services enhance sales (by increasing
sales volume and/or per unit prices) enough to cover the cost of
the services, one might expect retailers to provide those services
voluntarily. After all, retailers as well as manufacturers would
stand to benefit from such enhanced sales. Voluntary provision of
demand-enhancing point of sale services may not occur, however, if
some retailers are able to free ride off the efforts of other retailers.52
Suppose, for example, that one dealer of a high-end stereo system
provides customers with a knowledgeable sales staff and fancy
listening rooms where the equipment can be tested, and that a
nearby dealer provides no such services. A customer could easily go
to the former dealer to take advantage of the point of sale services
but then purchase the product from the latter dealer, which is able
to charge lower prices because it need not pay for those expensive
services." If such free riding is extensive, the high-service dealer
will find that it cannot profitably continue to offer costly point of
sale services and will cease to do so." The absence of such services
will injure the manufacturer by reducing demand for its products.
52. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price-Fixing and
Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 430-34 (1966); Telser, supra note 8, at 91-93.
53. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, § 11.3a, at 456 (discussing similar example involving
automobile dealers).
54. See Telser, supra note 8, at 91. Golf club manufacturer Ping, Inc. provided a similar
example of free riding in its amicus brief in support of the petitioner in Leegin. See Brief of
Ping, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480). Ping, long a leader in custom-fitting of golf
clubs, has invested substantial resources in training retailers on the complicated custom-
fitting process, a process that "requires 30 to 60 minutes to evaluate properly each golfer's
physical characteristics and swing in arriving at the golf club specifications unique to that
golfer." Id. at 6-7 n.2. Ping explained that free riding among discounters was injuring its
brand (and consumers of the brand):
Several years ago, free rider activity and other retail behavior, exacerbated by
internet sales, began to threaten the hard-earned reputation of the PING brand,
diminishing the demand for its products, and harming PING consumers. For
example, some price-cutting PING retailers were advising consumers to visit a
retailer that had invested in PING's custom-fitting program, request a custom-
fitting session, and then take the specifications for the custom-made PING clubs
back to the discounter for a "great deal," financed by the investments and efforts
of the servicing dealer that performed the custom fitting. PING recognized that
if such activities were allowed to continue unabated, most, if not all, of PING's
retailers would lose any incentive to perform custom fittings and other services
that are key to the PING brand and its ability to compete in the marketplace.
By 2004, PING's revenues reflected these harmful activities.
Id. at 7.
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In addition, consumers will suffer if, in fact, the point of sale
services originally provided were valued more than they cost to
produce.
This free rider problem could be addressed several different
ways. First, retailers might be able to sell separately those aspects
of retail service that enhance demand for the manufacturer's
product. For example, the stereo retailer could charge a small fee
for expert consultation and/or admittance to a listening room.55
Although these sorts of fees are not unheard of (for example, tennis
shops often charge a slight fee for use of a "demo" racquet), they are
relatively uncommon, presumably because of the high transaction
costs they entail.56 Alternatively, manufacturers could address the
free rider problem by requiring their dealers to adhere-to nonprice
restraints-either geographical restrictions that would separate
dealers so that consumers could not easily free ride or quality
standards dictating which retail services must be provided.57 These
sorts of restraints, which are relatively common and have been
subject to rule of reason scrutiny since 1977,58 are somewhat limited
in their ability to remedy free rider problems. Geographic restraints
cannot perfectly prevent free riding in an age in which consumers
travel extensively and Internet commerce is pervasive. 9 Moreover,
such restraints may be difficult to enforce. Quality standards are
difficult both to specify and to enforce, as explained below."0
RPM provides an alternative means of addressing the free rider
problem. If a manufacturer sets a minimum resale price beneath
which retailers may not price their products, retailers who other-
55. See Elzinga & Mills, supra note 26, at 1843 (noting that RPM may not be necessary
to combat free riding if retailers can "separate those aspects of retail service that build
demand for the manufacturer's product from other retailer activities and 'sell' them to
consumers, or the manufacturer, on a stand-alone basis').
56. Id. ("In many instances, transaction costs appear to prevent separate service sales
from eliminating all free riding.").
57. Id. (observing that "allowable nonprice vertical restraints" may be used to combat
freeriding).
58. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (holding that
vertical nonprice restraints are to be judged under the rule of reason).
59. For example, a retailer in one region could provide no service and sell cheap goods to
a local consumer, who could then resell the products via the Internet. The reselling consumer
would have no contractual relationship with the manufacturer and thus could not be subject
to territorial restraints.
60. See discussion infra Part I.B.l.b.
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wise might attempt to free ride lose the ability to offer the discounts
that permit them to usurp business from their higher service ri-
vals.61 Moreover, by setting the minimum retail price at a particular
level, the manufacturer may exercise some indirect control over the
level of point of sale services provided. When competing retailers
selling the manufacturer's products are precluded from competing
on price, they will attempt to win business by competing on nonprice
aspects of the deal, chiefly point of sale services.62 Thus, the higher
the minimum resale price the manufacturer sets, the greater the
level of point of sale services retailers will likely provide. Of course,
there are limits to which a manufacturer can raise resale prices to
enhance the desirability, and thus the total sales, of its product.63 If
the point of sale services provided by retailers competing because of
RPM are valued less by consumers than the incremental price
increase occasioned by RPM, then the RPM strategy will reduce
total sales, to the detriment of the manufacturer.
b. Enforcing Unspecified Agreements
Although the "avoidance of free riding" rationale for RPM is
probably the most commonly articulated procompetitive justification
for the practice, it has some important limitations. As an initial
matter, RPM is frequently observed in situations in which wide-
spread free riding on point of sale services seems implausible.64 In
61. See generally Telser, supra note 8, at 91 (setting forth the free rider justification for
RPM).
62. For an example of how limits on price competition lead to enhanced service com-
petition, contrast today's bare-bones service in air travel to the lavish service provided during
the era of airline regulation, when air fares were set by the government. Precluded from
competing on price, airlines competed vigorously on service, leading to a much more
luxurious-albeit more expensive-flying experience. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
POLICIES FOR THE DEREGULATED AIRLINE INDUSTRY 9 (1988) (noting that, following
deregulation, service competition decreased as price competition was liberalized); KEITH
LOVEGROVE, AIRLINE: IDENTITY, DESIGN AND CULTURE (2000) (highlighting airline amenities
prior to deregulation). Of course, the government, unlike a manufacturer that imposes RPM,
has no incentive to maximize total sales.
63. See Elzinga & Mills, supra note 26, at 1843-44 ("Needless to say, a product whose
quality is low cannot survive long in the marketplace just because it carries a high retail price
and appears in reputable retail stores. An RPM policy does not enable a manufacturer to
make a silk purse out of a sow's ear.").
64. Klein & Murphy, supra note 8, at 265 ("It is now generally recognized that there are
many cases of vertical restraints that do not fit the standard 'consumer free riding on special
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addition, it is unlikely that RPM actually eliminates the incentive
to free ride on other retailers' provision of services the manufacturer
desires. For example, even if a manufacturer sets a minimum resale
price at a level that would provide a margin sufficient to cover
desired point of sale services, individual retailers could still send
customers to other retailers to attain those services and then use
the markup provided by RPM to provide customers with some other
desired amenity, such as a discount on a complementary product. 5
If retailers took that tack, they could win business from the high
service retailers who bore the cost of the point of sale services, and
those high service retailers would eventually curtail their efforts.
Finally, the free rider explanation seems particularly implausible
when consumers, prior to purchase, cannot detect retailer services
that affect product quality, such as the regular rotation of items
possessing a limited shelf life.6
Motivated by these limitations of the free rider rationale for RPM,
Benjamin Klein and Kevin Murphy articulated an alternative the-
ory of how RPM may enhance the efficiency of the distributional
system. Klein and Murphy conceived of RPM as a means by which
manufacturers can secure retailers' compliance with incomplete
performance contracts aimed at inducing retail services that en-
hance demand for the manufacturers' products."7
Because some of the benefit stemming from a retailer's product
promotion efforts inures to the manufacturer, retailers are not
perfectly motivated to provide an optimal level of retail service (in
other words, service to the point at which the incremental cost of the
service, borne entirely by the retailer, equals the full incremental
benefit, some of which is captured by the manufacturer)." Accord-
services' theory.").
65. Id. at 266 (observing that the elimination of free riders argument relied upon "the
unrealistic assumption that the sole avenue of nonprice competition available to retailers is
the supply of the particular services desired by the manufacturer").
66. Id.
67. Id. at 266-67 (setting forth "an alternative theory of how vertical restraints operate
to induce desired dealer services," under which "[m]anufacturers are assumed to induce
desired dealer services through a private enforcement mechanism by which active
manufacturer monitoring and the threat of manufacturer termination assures dealer
performance').
68. See Elzinga & Mills, supra note 26, at 1844 ("Economic theory indicates that a
manufacturer cannot rely on the retailer to provide optimal retail service when the
manufacturer captures some of the benefits of that service."). For an explanation of the
1956 [Vol. 50:1937
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ingly, manufacturers need some way to encourage the optimal
provision of services. One option would be to employ complete,
express contracts: the manufacturer could exhaustively specify the
precise services the retailer must provide.6" The problem with this
approach is the difficulty of ex ante specification and enforcement.7"
It would be prohibitively costly to specify all the elements of dealer
performance in a way that would permit determination of breach
and measurement of damages."v In addition, monitoring and en-
forcing a dealer's performance obligations along multiple service
dimensions would require substantial effort. Using explicit contracts
to align the incentives of the manufacturer and its retailers is thus
difficult.
RPM can provide an alternative means by which a manufacturer
may secure services that enhance demand for its products. If the
manufacturer generally observes its retailers' performance, retains
a liberal right to terminate underperformers, and provides an at-
tractive retail margin as an incentive to avoid termination, then the
manufacturer can motivate its retailers to provide demand-enhanc-
ing point of sale services without specifying them exhaustively. As
Klein and Murphy explain:
divergence between a manufacturer's and its retailers' incentives to promote retail sales of
the manufacturer's products, see Benjamin Klein, Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in
the Absence of Free-Riding, Fed. Trade Comm'n Hearings on Resale Price Maintenance (Feb.
17, 2009), available at http://ftc.gov/opp/workshops/rpm/docs/bklein02l7.pdf.
69. See Elzinga & Mills, supra note 26, at 1844 ("The manufacturer, hypothetically, might
enter into a contract with the retailer that specifies exhaustively what services the retailer
must provide .....
70. Id.
71. Indeed, one of the reasons manufacturers "buy" distribution rather than "make" it is
that they do not possess expertise on exactly how their products can best be promoted to end
users.
72. As Klein & Murphy observe:
[I]t is generally recognized that it is uneconomic to create a complete contingent
contract to govern the employment relationship. A complete contingent contract
entails large transaction costs, rigidities, and hold-up potentials associated with
initial contractual negotiation and renegotiation in the face of changing market
conditions. In addition, many elements of performance, such as the energy and
enthusiasm the worker devotes to a particular task, are essentially un-
measurable (although not unobservable) and must remain unspecified and
unenforceable in court.
Klein & Murphy, supra note 8, at 294.
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The potential loss of this future quasi-rent stream [in other
words, RPM's margin guarantee] takes the place of a potential
court-imposed sanction in assuring dealer performance. If the
expected present discounted value of the future quasi-rent
stream earned by an honest dealer exceeds the expected value
of the gain to a dealer who shirks on the supply of desired
services, then the capital loss that can be imposed on a dealer by
manufacturer termination will be sufficient to assure dealer
performance.73
Thus, RPM's role in enhancing distributional efficiency (to the
benefit of manufacturers and consumers alike) extends well beyond
the context of point of sale services that are susceptible to free
riding."4
2. Facilitating Entry
New entrants into markets with large and established incumbent
firms-the very markets in which entry is most beneficial to
consumers-face difficulties. The incumbent firms have multiple
marketing advantages. For example, their brands are instantly
recognized without retailer promotion or extensive advertising.
Moreover, well-established, dominant brands are practically en-
sured desirable shelf space, for consumers know and want the
brands, and retailers find that they "must" carry them and display
them prominently in order to respond to their customers' desires.
By contrast, new entrants, who have neither widespread brand
recognition nor brand loyalty, need all the retailer promotion they
can get and cannot assume that they will attain favorable shelf
space.
RPM may provide much needed assistance to new entrants facing
these disadvantages. By giving retailers protection against discount-
ing and thus a guaranteed profit margin, RPM creates an incentive
for retailers to carry a new brand, display it prominently, and
perhaps even engage in more aggressive promotion efforts.'" Thus,
73. Id. at 268.
74. See Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, The Law and Economics of Resale Price
Maintenance, 13 REV. INDUS. ORG. 57, 72 (1998).
75. See Elzinga & Mills, supra note 26, at 1848 ("To secure entry, a new entrant may seek
to gain retail distribution by offering independent retailers protection against discounting, in
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RPM may benefit consumers by facilitating entry into markets with
strong brands. Because of this benefit, the dissent in Leegin
conceded that, if it were writing on a blank slate, it might create a
narrow exception to the per se rule against minimum RPM for use
of the practice by new entrants.76
3. Facilitating the Marketing of Products with Unpredictable
Demand
For many products such as books or musical recordings, consumer
demand is uncertain at the time the retailer must order the product
from the manufacturer. If consumer demand for a product turns out
to be strong, a retailer who carries it will do well, but if demand is
slack, the retailer may find itself with excess inventory. To dispose
of that inventory, it may offer deep discounts. Other retailers
carrying that product will similarly have to lower their prices as the
deep discounts reduce the market-clearing price.
Given the potential for precipitous price declines, retailers may
decline to stock products for which demand is uncertain, choosing
instead to wait for products to prove themselves in the market-
place.77 If enough retailers take that route, untested products will
have access to few retail outlets in which to establish their commer-
cial viability. The result may be that high quality products that
could have become commercial successes had they gained access to
enough retail outlets never have the opportunity to prove them-
selves. Consumers will be injured if those products cannot be
marketed.
A manufacturer may use RPM to address this problem. By setting
a minimum retail price, the manufacturer may prevent precip-
itous price declines during periods of slack demand. By reducing
the hope that margin protection will induce retailers to market and promote the new
product.").
76. See Leegin Creative Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2731 (2007) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) ("[flf forced to decide now, at most I might agree that the per se rule should be
slightly modified to allow an exception for the more easily identifiable and temporary
condition of'new entry." (citing Pitofsky, supra note 7, at 1495)).
77. Indeed, this is the strategy utilized by many discount retailers. See 8 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1601h, at 15 (observing that "deep discounters offer
significantly lower markups on books and CDs, but also a much narrower inventory largely
limited to titles whose popularity has already been proven").
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price volatility, the manufacturer will encourage retailers to take a
chance on untested products and to order larger inventories of such
products than they otherwise would order.78 This benefits both the
manufacturers of such products and consumers who otherwise
might be deprived of unproven products that turn out to be commer-
cial successes.
II. PROPOSALS FOR EVALUATING RPM UNDER THE RULE OF REASON
Given that minimum RPM may create anticompetitive harms of
the types identified in Part I.A, the sorts of procompetitive benefits
discussed in Part I.B, or some combination of benefit and harm, the
Leegin Court wisely ruled that the practice should not be per se
illegal."9 The open issue now is exactly how courts should go about
evaluating particular instances of RPM. Given that RPM's per se
illegality rendered that question moot, the issue has received far
less attention in the academic literature than has the matter of
RPM's general effects on competition. Nonetheless, a few proposals
have been suggested. This Part sets forth and critiques the leading
proposals for evaluating the legality of RPM agreements. Part III,
then, proposes an alternative approach.
A. Two Nonstarters: An Unstructured Rule of Reason and a Rule
of Per Se Legality
Before analyzing the structured rules of reason that have been
proposed for evaluating minimum RPM, we should briefly consider
two possible evaluative approaches that may be rejected out of
hand: an unstructured rule of reason and a rule of per se legality.
Both approaches are troubling as a matter of policy, and neither is
consistent with the Supreme Court's instructions on how to evaluate
RPM.
78. See Butz, supra note 8, at 433-36; Deneckere, Marvel & Peck, supra note 8, at 622.
79. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
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1. An Unstructured Rule of Reason
Under the classic statement of the rule of reason, courts are
directed to conduct a broad and free-wheeling inquiry into the
purpose and effect of a restraint of trade and to decide whether, on
balance, society is better off with the restraint than without it.80
That version of the rule of reason, set forth by Justice Brandeis in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States"' and frequently quoted in
both judicial opinions82 and jury instructions,8 3 states:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competi-
tion. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint
is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.84
Applied to minimum RPM, this version of the rule would direct the
fact-finder to determine, all things considered, whether the total
mix of goods and services resulting from RPM is more desirable
than the total mix that would result from unfettered price competi-
tion among dealers.
Such an inquiry is likely to be entirely indeterminate. Minimum
RPM generally results in higher prices for a manufacturer's product
80. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 105 (observing that because the classic statement
of the rule of reason "never defines what it is that courts are supposed to look for," it has led
courts to "engage[] in unfocused, wide-ranging expeditions into practically everything about
the business of large firms in order to determine whether a challenged practice was
unlawful"); see also Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 14 (1981) (observing that the classic
statement of the rule of reason "invites an unlimited, free-wheeling inquiry).
81. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
82. A Westlaw search reveals 242 federal opinions quoting the bulk of Justice Brandeis's
version of the rule.
83. Posner, supra note 80, at 15 (referring to "[t]he common practice of including in jury
instructions the passage ... from the Chicago Board of Trade opinion, often as the only guide
to the concept of unreasonable restraint that is offered to the jury").
84. Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
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but also enhanced point of sale services. The fact-finder thus would
have to decide whether the post-RPM outcome of higher prices with
more or better services is more or less desirable than the pre-RPM
outcome of lower prices with fewer or inferior services. Absent some
entirely arbitrary presumption that a low price is better than a high
level of service (or vice versa), there is simply no way to make that
decision.8" One might think that the overall desirability of one
outcome versus the other could be determined by looking at total
sales-that is, if the manufacturer's total sales increased when
dealer price competition was restrained, then the RPM is desirable;
if not, then it is not.86 But even putting aside the difficulties
inherent in that inquiry, a focus on total sales cannot answer the
question posed by the Brandeisian version of the rule of reason,
namely, whether total social utility is higher with the restraint
than without it.
Examination of RPM's effect on total sales cannot answer the
Brandeisian question because it is theoretically possible for RPM to
enhance a manufacturer's total sales and yet reduce total welfare. 7
To the extent RPM increases total sales of a manufacturer's
products, it does so by inducing services that make the product at
issue more desirable to the consumers who are "on the fence" as to
whether to buy the product. If the incremental services resulting
from RPM increase those marginal consumers' willingness to pay for
the product at issue more than it raises the product's price, then
RPM will result in a greater number of total sales, despite the
higher prices. But the additional services that attract new buyers
may not be of value to many consumers who value the product more
than marginal consumers and would be willing to pay more than the
market clearing price, even without the additional services occa-
85. Posner, supra note 80, at 19.
86. Judge Posner recommends this approach to determine if any instance of RPM is
procompetitive, in which competition is defined not as the process of rivalry but as the output-
maximizing outcome that results from vigorous rivalry that involves neither collusion nor
predation. Id. at 21. Notably, he does not contend that this approach could answer the
determinative question posed by the Brandeisian version of the rule of reason-that is,
whether the outcome with an instance of RPM is more desirable than without the RPM.
87. See generally Don Boudreaux & Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Inframarginal Consumers and
the Per Se Legality of Vertical Restraints, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137 (1988); Comanor, supra note
7; Marvel & McCafferty, The Welfare Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, supra note 8; A.
Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality and Regulation, 6 BELL J. ECON. 417 (1975).
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sioned by RPM."8 For those "inframarginal" consumers, RPM results
in a higher price that is not offset by additional valuable services.8 9
This means that their consumer surplus-their wealth gain from
buying the product at issue-is reduced by RPM. Thus, even if a
fact-finder were to focus solely on whether an instance of RPM had
increased a manufacturer's sales (a difficult enough inquiry), it
could not answer the Brandeisian question of whether the RPM led
to a more desirable state of affairs unless it could determine, for all
consumers of the product at issue, whether and to what extent they
really valued the incremental services. That task is impossible in
practice, and attempts to perform it will result in verdicts that are
no more than hunches.
Given its breadth and the lack of any determinative criterion, the
unstructured rule of reason is both costly to administer (because
proof must be taken on so many issues) and unpredictable (because
the outcome will depend largely on the fact-finder's hunches).
Employing such an unpredictable rule would tend to chill even
procompetitive uses of RPM, because businesses would not want to
risk an adverse treble damages verdict in order to secure RPM's
benefits.9" As explained below, most instances of RPM are likely
procompetitive,91 so the chilling effect of evaluating RPM under an
88. See Marvel & McCafferty, The Welfare Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, supra note
8, at 370:
Manufacturers, in their desire to maximize profits, focus on the margin, while
allocative efficiency incorporates effects on inframarginal customers .... The
additional customers attracted by the services must be better off as a result of
the service provision. But if some of the additional receipts are derived from
higher prices charged to inframarginal customers who do not value the services,
the benefits to society of the services provided need not justify their cost.
89. For example, if RPM results in a greater provision of product demonstration and
customer education services on, say, a computer with special graphic design capabilities,
consumers who are on the fence about buying that computer may be more willing to do so, as
they can easily learn of the product's functionality and other features. Those additional
demonstration and education services may not be of value, however, to business purchasers
that know the product well (or have their own information technology departments), use it
to generate revenue, and thus value it more than the typical noncommercial purchaser. The
RPM that generates the services valued by marginal noncommercial purchasers will simply
reduce the surplus inframarginal commercial purchasers receive from buying the product.
90. If a defendant supplier's RPM is deemed to violate the antitrust laws, the plaintiff is
entitled to treble damages. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
91. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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unstructured rule of reason would be undesirable as a matter of
policy.
Such an approach would also be legally infirm. The Leegin Court
expressly contemplated a more structured inquiry into the reason-
ableness of particular instances of RPM. After cataloguing specific
factors courts should consider-the pervasiveness of RPM in the
manufacturer market,92 the source of the restraint (whether it was
sought by dealers or imposed unilaterally by the manufacturer),93
and the market power of any dominant manufacturer or dealer 94
-the Court called for the lower courts to develop a structured
approach to evaluating RPM. It challenged them to "establish the
litigation structure to ensure the rule operates to eliminate anti-
competitive restraints from the market and to provide more
guidance to businesses,"95 and it suggested that they do so by
"devis[ing] rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions
where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way
to prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive
ones." 6 This is a far cry from the open-ended inquiry invited by the
unstructured rule of reason set forth by Justice Brandeis.
In addition, the free-wheeling inquiry invited by the unstructured
rule of reason is inconsistent with the Court's more recent teachings
on the rule. Although many courts-including the Supreme Court
-- continue to quote Justice Brandeis's classic statement, 97 the
Supreme Court has in recent years narrowed the rule of reason
inquiry to focus solely on a restraint's effects on competition, not its
92. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705,2719 (2007) ("[The
number of manufacturers that make use of the practice in a given industry can provide
important instruction. When only a few manufacturers lacking market power adopt the
practice, there is little likelihood it is facilitating a manufacturer cartel, for a cartel then can
be undercut by rival manufacturers.").
93. Id. ("The source of the restraint may also be an important consideration. If there is
evidence retailers were the impetus for a vertical price restraint, there is a greater likelihood
that the restraint facilitates a retailer cartel or supports a dominant, inefficient retailer.").
94. Id. at 2720 ("Mhat a dominant manufacturer or retailer can abuse resale price
maintenance for anticompetitive purposes may not be a serious concern unless the relevant
entity has market power.").
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343
n.13 (1982).
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effects generally.9" Thus, it would be improper for courts to consider
noncompetition matters such as the extent to which the additional
services induced by an instance of RPM are really "valuable" to
different groups of consumers (specifically, whether the utility gains
to marginal consumers exceed the losses to inframarginal consum-
ers). It would also be improper for courts to determine whether an
instance of RPM has increased or decreased competition by
balancing the intrabrand competition loss resulting from the RPM
against the accompanying gain in interbrand competition. Such an
inquiry, which equates competition with the process of rivalry,
would be completely indeterminate.99 If competition was instead
defined in terms of market-wide output (that is, a restraint has
enhanced competition if it has increased overall output), then a
court might properly apply the focused rule of reason by asking
whether an instance of RPM has increased or decreased the
manufacturer's total sales."° Such an output-based inquiry is,
however, difficult to conduct in practice, 10 and courts would benefit
from an alternative legality test that is easier to apply. The
structured rule of reason proposed in Part III suggests a more
administrable evaluative approach that could be used as an
alternative to the theoretically sound but difficult to apply output-
based approach. 02
2. Per Se Legality
A second approach that may be rejected out of hand is a rule of
per se legality for RPM agreements. Judge (then Professor) Richard
Posner set forth this approach in a 1981 law review article entitled
The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:
98. See, e.g., Nat1 Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)
("Contrary to its name, the Rule [of reason] does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any
argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of reason. Instead,
it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions.").
99. See Posner, supra note 80, at 19.
100. See id. at 21. Indeed, this Article's proposed evaluative approach endorses this sort
of output-based inquiry as an acceptable, albeit difficult to implement, means of applying the
rule of reason to challenged instances of RPM. See discussion infra Part III.B.
101. See Posner, supra note 80, at 19.
102. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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Per Se Legality.'° Putting aside the fact that Leegin's holding
forecloses a rule of per se legality,'0 4 Posner's approach may be
infirm on policy grounds. His conclusion that per se legality is the
optimal evaluative approach followed from two premises, both of
which are questionable.
First, Posner argued that the rule of reason is inevitably so
vacuous that determinations under it will be so unpredictable as
to chill the use of RPM, which is usually procompetitive. 10' He
observed that the Brandeis version of the rule "invites an unlimited,
free-wheeling inquiry,"'16 and he asserted that even if the inquiry is
focused solely on the competitive effects of a practice (not on all its
effects), "the trier of fact is left in the dark as to how to decide
whether a challenged practice is substantially anticompetitive.""'
Because most fact-finders are ill-equipped to engage in an in-depth
inquiry into competitive effect, the risk of mistake-most likely, the
risk of false positives-is great. In short, Posner concluded, "A
standard so poorly articulated and particularized, applied by
tribunals so poorly equipped to understand and apply it, places at
considerable hazard any restriction that a manufacturer imposes on
its dealers and distributors."' ' Application of the rule of reason,
then, is likely to chill procompetitive instances of RPM.
Posner's second premise was that scrutiny of minimum RPM
itself provides little incremental benefit.' °9 He reasoned that in the
primary situations in which RPM could cause or exacerbate anti-
competitive harm-dealer cartels and manufacturer cartels-the
conventional rules applicable to horizontal conspiracies could
adequately protect against such harm."0 He explained:
[C]ases in which dealers or distributors collude to eliminate
competition among themselves and bring in the manufacturer to
103. Posner, supra note 80.
104. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007)
(holding that instances of minimum RPM must be evaluated under rule of reason).
105. See Posner, supra note 80, at 14-18.
106. Id. at 14.
107. Id. at 15.
108. Id. Posner further observed that where courts had articulated steps for evaluating
nonprice restraints, there had been "no rule for deciding such cases," rather merely "a
checklist of factors to which different triers of fact give different weights." Id. at 18.
109. Id. at 22.
110. Id.
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enforce their cartel, or in which vertical restrictions are used to
enforce a cartel among manufacturers, can be dealt with under
the conventional rules applicable to horizontal price-fixing
conspiracies. They are not purely vertical cases, and they would
be decided the same way even if purely vertical restrictions were
legal per se."'
Concluding that the regulation of RPM could cause affirmative
harm (premise one) without providing any significant incremental
benefit (premise two), Posner determined that the optimal rule for
RPM agreements would be one of per se legality.112
Both of Posner's premises are contestable. The first assumes that
the rule of reason must be open-ended and ignores the possibility of
a structured rule of reason under which a fact-finder would make
subsidiary findings that generate an ultimate conclusion. If the
structured rule of reason were tailored to minimize false positives
and to include reliable safe harbors, businesses could continue to
engage in procompetitive RPM, but anticompetitive (and presum-
ably rare) instances of the practice could still be punished (and thus
deterred). If the subsidiary findings demanded of the fact-finder
involved manageable inquiries, the administrative costs of such a
rule would not be excessive. Part III sets forth a structured rule of
reason that is both easy to administer and unlikely to generate false
positives or create a chilling effect.
Posner's second premise improperly assumes that collusion
involving RPM can be policed under the rules governing horizontal
conspiracies. To establish a violation of those rules, a plaintiff or
prosecutor must establish an agreement among the purportedly
conspiring parties."3 Doing so can be difficult. Although precedents
permit a fact-finder to infer such an agreement from evidence of
conscious parallelism and so-called "plus factors" indicating that
the parallel conduct is the result of some commitment to a common
scheme," 4 it can be quite challenging to establish those plus
factors." 5 The result is that much tacit collusion goes unpun-
111. Id.
112. Id. at 23-26.
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (forbidding only contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in
restraint of trade).
114. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939).
115. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986)
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ished."6 Indeed, Posner himself has argued that the law should
address such tacit collusion by finding antitrust violations when
market conditions would support collusive pricing and parties
appear to be using "facilitators" that aid in promoting a common
output reduction/price increase." 7 That is precisely what would be
accomplished by regulating RPM under a structured rule of reason.
The fact-finder would determine whether the market at issue is ripe
for collusion and, if so, the use of RPM-a collusion facilita-
tor-would violate the antitrust laws. It is ironic that Posner would
maintain that the existing rules governing horizontal conspiracies
preclude the need to police RPM when he has so vigorously main-
tained that the horizontal conspiracy rules are hamstrung by an
overly stringent agreement requirement and should be expanded so
that they regulate the use of facilitators in collusion prone markets.
Of course, the policy dispute over the desirability of a rule of per
se legality is ultimately moot, because the Leegin Court made clear
that courts are to police minimum RPM under some version of the
rule of reason."8 Thus, a rule of per se legality, like an unstructured
rule of reason, is a nonstarter. We turn, then, to proposals for
structured rules of reason.
B. The States'Proposed Approach: Higher Price Places Burden on
Defendant To Prove Procompetitive Effect that Could Not Have
Been Achieved Less Restrictively
One proposed rule of reason approach would automatically place
the burden on the defendant to establish that the RPM at issue had
a procompetitive effect that could not have been achieved less
restrictively. That is the approach espoused by twenty-seven states
(holding that in order to survive motion for summary judgment or directed verdict, plaintiff
seeking to establish agreement on basis of circumstantial evidence "must produce evidence
that tends to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently"
(internal quotation omitted)).
116. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 126-36 (asserting that a "lawyerly" approach
to finding an agreement leaves most tacit collusion unpunished and arguing instead for an
"economic" approach).
117. See POSNER, supra note 27, at 51-93; Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust
Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1582 (1969).
118. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2719-20 (2007)
(rejecting per se legality for RPM and calling for evaluation under rule of reason).
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in a recent dispute involving women's footwear manufacturer,
Nine West Group, Inc. (Nine West).119 In written comments urging
the FTC not to modify a 2000 consent order precluding Nine West
from any activity that might constitute minimum RPM, the at-
torneys general of the twenty-seven states set forth a general
proposal for evaluating minimum RPM agreements under the rule
of reason.O2
The states began by exhorting the Commission to follow the
analytical approach endorsed by the D.C. Circuit in Polygram
Holding, Inc. v. FTC.'2' Under that approach, which builds on the
"quick look" or truncated rule of reason the Supreme Court began
to apply in 1978 in Professional Engineers,22 an antitrust tribunal
119. Based on Nine West's designation of "off limits" or "non-promote" shoes that its
retailers were not to promote except during designated sale periods, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) claimed that Nine West had violated the per se rule against minimum
RPM. See Complaint, In re Nine West Group, Inc., No. C-3937 (F.T.C. Apr. 11, 2000),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ninewestcmp.htm. In April 2000, Nine West agreed
to a broadly worded consent order requiring it to refrain from (among other things): fixing
prices at which its retailers may sell, advertise, or promote its products; "otherwise
pressuring" its dealers to adhere to resale prices; and "[s]ecuring or attempting to secure any
commitment or assurance from any dealer concerning the resale price at which the dealer may
advertise, promote, offer for sale or sell any Nine West Products." See Decision and Order, In
re Nine West Group, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-3937 (Apr. 11, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ninewest.do.htm. After the Supreme Court abrogated the per
se rule against minimum RPM, Nine West petitioned the FTC for a modification of this
consent order. See Petition to Reopen and Modify Order, In re Nine West Group, Inc., No. C-
3937 (F.T.C. Apr. 11, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/9810386/071106
petition.pdf.
120. See Amended States' Comments Urging Denial of Nine West's Petition, In re Nine
West Group, Inc., No. C-3937 (F.T.C. Apr. 11, 2000), available at http://www.oag.state.
ny.us/bureaus/antitrustpdfs/AmendedStatecomments_O1170-9west.pdf [hereinafter
Amended States' Comments].
121. Id. at 5 (asserting that governing rule of reason should be based on approach of In re
Polygram Holding, Inc., No. 9298, available at 2003 WL 21770765 (F.T.C. 2003), affd, 416
F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
122. Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Since Professional
Engineers, which applied a truncated ("quick look") rule of reason analysis, see id. at 688, the
Supreme Court has emphasized that the level of analysis required for judging the
reasonableness of a restraint of trade falls along a spectrum and depends upon the depth of
analysis required for determining the likely competitive effect of any particular trade
restraint. As the Court explained in California Dental Ass'n v. FTC:
The truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less
fixed than terms like "per se," "quick look," and "rule of reason" tend to make
them appear. We have recognized, for example, that "there is often no bright line
separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis," since "considerable inquiry into
market conditions" may be required before the application of any so-called "per
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considering a practice that is "inherently suspect," though not per
se illegal, may presume the practice unreasonable unless the
defendant "either identiffies] some reason the restraint is unlikely
to harm consumers or identiffies] some competitive benefit that
plausibly offsets the apparent or anticipated harm.' 23 A practice is
"inherently suspect" if there is a "close family resemblance between
the suspect practice and another practice that already stands
convicted in the court of consumer welfare.' 24
Minimum RPM is inherently suspect, the states maintained,
because it inevitably raises consumer prices and thus bears a "close
family resemblance" to per se illegal horizontal price fixing.125
Accordingly, the states argued, RPM should be presumptively illegal
unless the defendant establishes a procompetitive benefit that
offsets the anticompetitive harm. 126 To do so, the defendant must
show that RPM increased its total sales. 2 v Such proof would
indicate that the RPM resulted in retail services that were of
greater value to consumers than the incremental price increase
occasioned by the practice.
se" condemnation is justified .... [There is generally no categorical line to be
drawn between restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of
anticompetitive effect and those that call for more detailed treatment. What is
required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances,
details, and logic of a restraint. The object is to see whether the experience of the
market has been so clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion
about the principal tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick (or at least
quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one.
Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779-81 (1999).
123. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
124. Id. at 37.
125. Amended States' Comments, supra note 120, at 8 ("If consumers pay more because of
vertical price-fixing, the restraint should be 'inherently suspect.").
126. Id. ("Under PolyGram, Nine West then has the burden of proving a plausible and
cognizable justification."); cf. Veronica Kayne, Resale Price Maintenance and the Rule of
Reason: The Liability Risk Increases, SESOURCE: THE MONTHLY ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTER OF
THE ABA SECTION ON BUSINESS LAW, July 2007, at 5 (noting that under post-Leegin rule of
reason, "[i]f the plaintiff [complaining of RPM] starts off with evidence of a price increase,
then the defendant will have to demonstrate that it is not an anticompetitive price increase
or show countervailing procompetitive benefits").
127. Amended States' Comments, supra note 120, at 8 (arguing that Nine West should be
required to prove that "(1) its vertical price fixing caused retailers to provide actual enhanced
value or services; (2) the enhanced value or services increased demand for its shoes; and (3)
the increased demand from that value or those services was greater than the decreased
demand caused by the higher price that consumers paid").
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But even if the defendant made this required showing, the RPM
at issue would not stand acquitted under the states' approach. The
showing of procompetitive effect would merely shift the burden to
the party challenging the RPM to show that the procompetitive
benefit could have been achieved less restrictively by, for example,
mandating the retail services provided or paying retailers to provide
such services.12 If the challenger showed the possibility of a less
restrictive means of inducing the demand-enhancing services, the
defendant would then have to show that the purportedly less
restrictive alternative was actually a less efficient means of
achieving the retail services at issue.'29
Although the states' proposed approach appears on first glance to
embody a fairly balanced burden shifting regime, in actual practice
it would automatically place a heavy burden on the defendant
and would likely lead to the condemnation of many-perhaps
most-instances of RPM. First, the threshold determination of an
"inherently suspect" practice would be automatically satisfied, for
practically every instance of minimum RPM results in an increase
in consumer prices.13° The defendant would thus always bear the
burden of proving that the RPM at issue increased total sales, and
any failure of proof on that point would result in a verdict for the
challenger. Next, even if the defendant could prove that the RPM
increased total sales, it would inevitably have to make the addi-
tional showing that the services generating the additional sales
could not have been induced in a less restrictive fashion, for the
party challenging the RPM will always be able to assert that such
services could have been explicitly required by the manufacturer.'31
128. Id. ("Even if that showing were made, the Commission would need to consider whether
the enhanced value or services could be achieved in a less restrictive way than by vertical
price-fixing.").
129. Id. at 8-9 & n.14.
130. See THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR., RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES
AND EMPIRIcAL EVIDENCE 116-17, 160 (1983).
131. For example, the states shifted the burden back to Nine West to show the
nonexistence of a less restrictive alternative by simply asserting:
Vertical pricefixing is not invariably the most efficient way to achieve
procompetitive effects. The manufacturer could require its distributors to
provide services as a matter of contract and even pay separately for those
services. In that circumstance, the manufacturer could terminate or threaten to
terminate the relationship if the retailer did not live up to those obligations.
That alternative way of fostering services for consumers is more effective and
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The upshot is that any instance of minimum RPM will be con-
demned unless the defendant can prove (1) that the RPM induced
retail services that enhanced total sales, and (2) that the manufac-
turer could not have induced those services as efficiently by
expressly contracting for them.
Both prongs would be difficult to prove. The first would require
the defendant to show that sales figures following the imposition of
RPM were more favorable than they would have been absent the
RPM. To make that showing, the defendant would have to employ
sophisticated statistical methods to separate out conflating influ-
ences and thereby isolate the effects of RPM.132 The second prong
would require the defendant to prove the high costs of ex ante
contracting for the provision of desired services. Looking at things
in hindsight, fact-finders (especially jurors with little business
experience) often have a hard time recognizing the practical
difficulties associated with drafting and enforcing completely
specified performance contracts.
Because both showings that would be required of defendants
under the states' proposed approach are difficult to make, most
challenges to instances of minimum RPM will have a substantial
chance of succeeding-this generates an adverse treble damages
verdict133 that largely deters RPM. That would be an undesirable
outcome because, as explained below, it is likely that most instances
of RPM are procompetitive. T'
efficient than threatening to terminate the relationship because the retailer is
not charging consumers a higher price.
Amended States' Comments, supra note 120, at 9. Any party challenging RPM could simply
parrot these precise words in order to shift the burden to the defendant to prove that the
output enhancement could not have been achieved as efficiently using a less restrictive
means.
132. See Posner, supra note 80, at 21 (noting that proving output enhancement following
use of RPM "requires controlling for the effects on the firm's output of exogenous factors, that
is, those unrelated to the challenged practice itself. There are statistical methods for doing
this, but they are not fool-proof in application, nor are they easy for judges and juries to
understand").
133. See supra note 90.
134. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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C. The FTC Approach: Defendant Can Avoid Burden of Proving
Procompetitive Effect of RPM Only if It Proves Absence of "Leegin
Factors"
In ruling on Nine West's petition for modification of the 2000
consent order, the FTC declined to follow the states' proposed
evaluative approach but adopted a similar, though less stringent,
approach. 3 5 The Commission agreed with the states that minimum
RPM should be evaluated using some version of the truncated rule
of reason analysis approved in Polygram Holdings."' It did not
agree, though, that every instance of RPM that raises consumer
prices is "inherently suspect."'37 Instead, the Commission reasoned
that a defendant should be able to avoid the conclusion that its
RPM is inherently suspect, and thus avoid the need to prove
procompetitive effect, by proving the absence of the factors the
Leegin Court identified "for identifying when RPM might be
subjected to closer analytical scrutiny."'3 8 Those factors were: (1)
that the RPM is used by manufacturers collectively comprising a
significant portion of the product market;3 9 (2) that dealers, rather
than the manufacturer, were the impetus for the RPM; 40 and (3)
135. See Order Granting in Part Petition to Reopen and Modify Order Issued April 11,
2000, In re Nine West Group Inc., No. C-3937 (F.T.C. May 6, 2008), at 11-14, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/9810386/080506order.pdf [hereinafter Nine West Order].
136. Id. at 12 ("The Leegin decision may be read to suggest a truncated analysis, such as
the one applied in Polygram Holdings, might be suitable for analyzing minimum resale price
maintenance agreements, at least under some circumstances.").
137. Id. at 13. ('The [Leegin] Court also explicitly noted that evidence of price effects would
only be the beginning point for further analysis of competitive harm. This seems to indicate
the Court's view that the price setting associated with an RPM agreement ordinarily is less
intrinsically dangerous than agreements among direct rivals to set prices or other terms of
trade.").
138. Id. at 14.
139. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2719 (2007)
("When only a few manufacturers lacking market power adopt the practice, there is little
likelihood it is facilitating a manufacturer cartel .... Resale price maintenance should be
subject to more careful scrutiny, by contrast, if many competing manufacturers adopt the
practice.")
140. Id. ("If there is evidence retailers were the impetus for a vertical price restraint, there
is a greater likelihood that the restraint facilitates a retailer cartel or supports a dominant,
inefficient retailer .... If, by contrast, a manufacturer adopted the policy independent of
retailer pressure, the restraint is less likely to promote anticompetitive conduct.").
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that there is a dominant manufacturer or dealer that possesses
market power. 141 Because Nine West proved the absence of all these
factors, it was not required to make the further showing that its use
of RPM was procompetitive. 142 Had it failed to establish an absence
of the "Leegin factors," it would have been required to prove that its
use of RPM had actually enhanced its output (that is, had led to
increased total sales despite higher prices) .143 Notably, the Commis-
sion required Nine West to file regular reports showing that its use
of RPM benefits consumers and that the Leegin factors remain
absent. 144
The FTC's resolution of Nine West's petition for modification thus
suggests that the legality of RPM agreements should be determined
as follows: once a minimum RPM agreement is established, the
defendant bears the burden of proving: (1) that RPM is not used by
manufacturers collectively comprising a significant share of the
relevant product market; (2) that it, not its dealers, initiated the
RPM; and (3) that there is no dominant manufacturer or dealer with
market power. If it makes these showings, its RPM is presumed
legal for the time being. (Subsequent challenges to the RPM may
burden the defendant to establish continued absence of the Leegin
factors.) If the defendant cannot prove that the Leegin factors are
absent, then its RPM constitutes an unreasonable restraint and is
illegal unless the defendant proves that the RPM enhanced its total
sales relative to what they would have been absent the pricing
policy. 4
5
The FTC's proposed approach is likely to condemn fewer in-
stances of RPM than the states' approach, for a defendant can avoid
the difficult showing of enhanced sales if it establishes the absence
of the Leegin factors. Still, though, the defendant would bear a
141. Id. at 2720 ("Mhat a dominant manufacturer or retailer can abuse resale price
maintenance for anticompetitive purposes may not be a serious concern unless the relevant
entity has market power.").
142. Nine West Order, supra note 135, at 15.
143. Id. at 15-16 ("If we were to conclude that Nine West runs afoul of the Leegin factors
and raises competitive concern, Nine West could also meet its burden by demonstrating that
its use of resale price maintenance is procompetitive.").
144. Id. at 17-18.
145. The FTC did not state whether the defendant would bear the additional burden of
proving that the enhanced output could not have been achieved as efficiently using less
restrictive means.
1974 [Vol. 50:1937
2009] DR. MILES IS DEAD. NOW WHAT? 1975
substantial burden. First and most notably, it would have to
establish the relevant market, always a difficult task.'46 In its
consideration of Nine West's petition for modification, for example,
the FTC required Nine West to expend significant effort demon-
strating the contours of the market in which it participates. 47
Having established the market, the defendant would then have to
produce data on the use of RPM by other manufacturers in that
market and on the market shares of those manufacturers. It would
then have to prove that it, not its dealers, initiated the RPM. That
showing could be difficult to make if there was any evidence that
high service dealers had complained about their low service,
presumably cheaper, rivals. Those dealer complaints, which may
simply have alerted the defendant to the need to control dealer
quality by reducing price competition,'48 might be taken to suggest
that dealers were the impetus for the restraint. Finally, the
defendant would have to establish its own lack of market power and
the absence of market power on the part of each of its dealers. The
latter showing would presumably require it to establish a second
market (the dealer market). If the defendant failed to make any of
146. See, e.g., MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 210 (4th
ed. 1997) ("In theory and practice, relevant market definition is as difficult an undertaking
as any in antitrust.").
147. For example, the FTC required Nine West to provide answers to the following
questions about market contours and entry barriers in order to establish the market in which
it participates:
Please break out, if possible, Nine West's approximate market shares in
identifiable segments of the overall market, e.g., dress shoes, casual shoes,
walking/light exercise shoes, sandals, etc. Also, state any arguments or evidence
about why these lines are or are not antitrust markets.
How difficult is it for a new manufacturer/distributor of women's shoes to
develop a brand, i.e., how long does it take, how costly is it to get shelf space in
retail locations, does it matter if the distributor has other shoes or is a new
entrant, how much cost is involved in brand development, e.g., market studies,
advertising, etc., do brand entry conditions vary by type of shoe, e.g., easier to
enter with a sandal than a dress shoe?
Letter from Ronald S. Rolfe, Esq., Cravath, Swaine & Moore, LLP to Eric D. Rohlck, Federal
Trade Commission, In re Nine West Group, Inc., No. C-3937 (F.T.C. Mar. 26, 2008), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/9810386/080326ninewestadditionalinfoltr. pdf.
148. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1984) (observing
that manufacturers who respond to dealer complaints about price cutting dealers may be
motivated by a concern to preserve or enhance dealer services, not by a desire to assist the
complaining dealers).
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these showings, then it would have to satisfy the difficult proof
burden set forth under the states' proposed approach.
Although the FTC approach would not be as restrictive as the
states' proposed approach, it is likely that the difficulty of making
the showings necessary to avoid treble damages liability would
similarly deter many procompetitive instances of RPM.
D. The Comanor/Scherer Approach: RPM Is Unreasonable if
Retailer-Initiated; Otherwise, Focus on Quantitative Foreclosure
A third proposal for a structured rule of reason is that set forth by
economists William S. Comanor and Frederic M. Scherer in their
Leegin amicus brief.149 Comanor and Scherer, who have separately
questioned the purported procompetitive benefits of RPM,"0
submitted their amicus brief "supporting neither party."15' One
purpose of their brief was "to suggest a tractable approach for
implementing antitrust standards on RPM."' In particular, they
wrote "to suggest ... guidelines" for implementation of a rule of
reason by the lower courts.'
The structured rule of reason proposed by Comanor and Scherer
would begin with a "quick look" to determine whether the restraint
was instigated by the manufacturer or its distributors.'54 Evidence
that distributors were the impetus for the restraint would result in
its condemnation, unless the manufacturer defendant could show
"credible contradictory evidence" undermining that finding.'
If the initial inquiry revealed that the restraint was instigated by
the manufacturer, then the legality of the RPM would turn on "a
test of quantitative substantiality."'5 6 A party challenging RPM
149. Brief for William S. Comanor and Frederic M. Scherer as Amici Curiae Supporting
Neither Party, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No.
06-480), available at 2007 WL 173679 [hereinafter Comanor/Scherer Brief].
150. See, e.g., SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 7, at 541-48; Comanor, supra note 7, at 984;
Scherer, supra note 7, at 697.
151. Comanor/Scherer Brief, supra note 149.
152. Id. at 1.
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id. at 8-9.
155. Id. at 9 ("Evidence from a quick look that the restraint was induced by distributors
should lead to the presumption of a per se violation, rebuttable on the presentation of credible
contradictory evidence.").
156. Id. ("[P]reliminary evidence that the restraint was instigated by the manufacturer
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would have two options for establishing a prima facie case for
liability under the quantitative substantiality test. First, the
challenger could show (1) that at least 50 percent of sales in the
relevant product market were subject to RPM (presumably includ-
ing sales by manufacturers that have vertically integrated forward
into retailing); and (2) that the challenged RPM extended the
practice's coverage by at least 10 percent of relevant sales. 157
Alternatively, the challenger could show (1) that the product market
at issue is oligopolistic, with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
exceeding 1800;15 and (2) that the challenged RPM was being
implemented by a manufacturer with at least a 10 percent share of
the relevant market.159 If the challenger made either of those two-
pronged showings, then the RPM would be deemed illegal unless the
defendant could prove either "that the relevant market [was]
improperly defined, that consumers' choices have not in fact been
significantly limited, ... or that the restraints were necessary to
sustain the provision of services valuable to consumers."'6 ° The
second and third of these options would presumably require some
sort of proof that the RPM enhanced total sales relative to what
they would have been absent the restraint and that the RPM was
more efficient than less restrictive means at inducing the dealer
services that generated those enhanced sales-the same showing
required of defendants under the states' proposed approach. 6'
Like the proposed approaches of the states and the FTC, the rule
of reason approach proposed by Comanor and Scherer would over-
deter RPM. First, the initial "quick look" is overly broad in its
condemnation. A rule that automatically indicts any instance of
dealer instigated RPM ignores the fact that such RPM may well be
output-enhancing and thus procompetitive. To determine whether
should trigger a rule of reason adjudication. Where a rule of reason approach is appropriate,
a test of quantitative substantiality should be applied.").
157. Id.
158. A market's HHI is determined by summing the squares of the market share
percentages of all participants in the market. Thus, a market consisting of six firms with
market shares of 20 percent, 20 percent, 20 percent, 20 percent, 10 percent, and 10 percent
would have an HHI of 1800 (400 + 400 + 400 + 400 + 100 + 100). See POSNER, supra note 27,
at 70.
159. Comanor/Scherer Brief, supra note 149, at 10.
160. Id.
161. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
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an instance of RPM is procompetitive or anticompetitive, a fact-
finder should decide whether the dominant rationale for the practice
is the manufacturer's interest in enhancing the attractiveness of its
products (in which case the RPM is procompetitive) or the dealer's
or manufacturer's interest in facilitating collusion or erecting entry
barriers (in which case the RPM is anticompetitive). The identity of
the party instigating an instance of RPM does not reveal the
dominant rationale for the practice. 162 As the Supreme Court has
long recognized, dealer complaints about price cutting, low service
rivals may induce a manufacturer to impose RPM as a means of
encouraging the dealer efforts that will enhance demand for its
products.'63 Thus, it is quite possible that an instance of RPM could
be instigated by a group of dealers but yet motivated by the manufac-
turer's desire to induce dealer promotion and quality enhancement
efforts. Such RPM would be procompetitive and should not be
automatically condemned."
In addition, the rule of reason Comanor and Scherer would apply
to manufacturer initiated instances of RPM is overly prohibitive.
Because the initial quick look would have weeded out instances in
162. An analogy may help explain why the identity of the instigating party does not reveal
the dominant motivation for the practice. Suppose a homeowner has a large, old tree on the
edge of her property. The tree's large branches extend over both the owner's house and her
neighbor's fence. When the neighbor discovers that the tree is rotting, he asks the owner to
cut it down to protect his fence. While the owner loves the old tree and would rather pay to
replace her neighbor's fence than to chop down the tree, she realizes that her failure to
remove the tree endangers her own house. She therefore chops down the tree. Although her
neighbor's complaint/request instigated her decision to chop down the tree, it was not the
motivation for her action. Similarly, although a retailer's (or retailer group's) request for RPM
may induce a manufacturer to impose such a policy, the request may not be the motivation
for the policy if the manufacturer adopts it to encourage product promotion efforts.
163. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1988) (observing
that "price cutting and some measure of service cutting usually go hand in hand"); Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762 (1984) ("[1t is precisely in cases in which the
manufacturer attempts to further a particular marketing strategy by means of agreements
on often costly nonprice restrictions that it will have the most interest in the distributors'
resale prices.").
164. As noted, the Comanor/Scherer approach would allow a defendant to avoid
condemnation of its RPM following a showing that the restraint was induced by distributors
if the defendant presented "credible contradictory evidence." Comanor/Scherer Brief, supra
note 149, at 9. If the defendant were permitted to discharge this burden by showing that the
policy was ultimately motivated by manufacturer concerns about dealer efforts, then this
initial quick look is less troubling. The approach's narrow focus on the identity of the RPM
instigator suggests, however, that evidence concerning ultimate motivation would not save
a dealer-initiated instance of RPM from condemnation. See id.
1978
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which dealer collusion could be afoot,165 the focus of the rule of
reason analysis would be to identify instances of RPM that could be
facilitating manufacturer collusion.'66 As explained in greater detail
in Part III.B.1, RPM can aid such collusion only when the use of
RPM is widespread among the manufacturers competing in a
market that is susceptible to collusion because it is concentrated,
the product at issue is relatively fungible, and there are substantial
barriers to entry.16
7
Both liability tests under the latter part of the Comanor/Scherer
approach would presumptively condemn instances of RPM even
when the prerequisites for anticompetitive harm-widespread use,
concentrated market, fungible product, entry barriers-are not fully
satisfied. The first test (RPM covers at least 50 percent of sales and
challenged instance would expand coverage by 10 percent)68
requires widespread use of the practice but does not require that the
market at issue be structurally capable of being cartelized. Because
one would expect widespread use of RPM precisely when it provides
the greatest efficiency benefits, such use should not suffice to
establish a prima facie case of illegality. The second test (market is
highly concentrated and defendant using RPM has at least 10
percent market share)'69 requires one of the structural factors
necessary for cartelization (high concentration) but does not
require the other structural prerequisites (entry barriers, fungible
product) or that the use of RPM be widespread. Thus, both tests
for establishing the presumptive illegality of RPM under the
Comanor/Scherer approach would condemn too many instances of
the practice. Although defendants would have an opportunity to
rebut the presumption of illegality, doing so would be difficult for
165. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
166. The post-quick look part of the Comanor/Scherer approach is focused on detecting
manufacturer collusion. Comanor/Scherer Brief, supra note 149, at 9. It is unsuitable for
detecting the potential noncollusion anticompetitive harm created by RPM: the erection of
entry barriers by a dominant manufacturer. As explained below, anticompetitive foreclosure
from such a use of RPM could occur only if the RPM at issue was likely to induce
discrimination against other brands, and the retailers subject to RPM on the defendant's
brand constituted a substantial percentage of the available marketing outlets for the product
at issue. See infra notes 219, 268-69 and accompanying text.
167. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
168. See supra text accompanying note 157.
169. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
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reasons explained above.17 ° The Comanor/Scherer approach would
therefore over-deter RPM.
E. The Antitrust Law Approach
A fourth structured rule of reason approach for evaluating the
legality of minimum RPM is that set forth in the influential
Antitrust Law treatise.' 7 ' Well before the overruling of Dr. Miles, the
treatise authors proposed an alternative rule of reason approach
that could replace the per se rule.'72
Under the treatise's approach, a plaintiff could set forth its prima
facie case by showing one of the following factors:' 73
1. the manufacturer's market is concentrated (HHI >
1200), and RPM arrangements or their equivalent'74
cover a substantial portion of total sales (at least 15
percent); 1 5
2. the dealer market is concentrated (HHI > 1200);176
3. RPM arrangements or their equivalent are widespread
throughout the product market, covering at least 50
percent of sales;'77
4. the RPM arrangement was dealer initiated, meaning
that it was adopted after "demand by dealers acting
collectively" (defined as two or more dealers acting in
concert or an association of dealers) or a "request by a
'dominant' dealer" (defined as one that accounts for 30
percent of the manufacturer's local or total sales of a
170. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
171. The Antitrust Law treatise is so extensively "relied on ... by [antitrust] lawyers and
judges that U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer once remarked ... that most lawyers
would prefer to have on their side 'two paragraphs of Areeda on antitrust than four Courts
of Appeals and three Supreme Court Justices."' Langdell's West Wing Renamed in Honor of
Areeda, HARVARD GAZETTE, Apr. 25, 1996, available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/
1996/04.25/LangdelsWestWi.html.
172. See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1633a, at 328-39.
173. Id. 1633el, at 337.
174. This would include sales by manufacturers that had vertically integrated forward into
the retail market.
175. 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1633c1(A), at 330.
176. Id. 1633c1(B), at 331. The treatise deems a retailer market concentrated if the HHI
exceeds 1200. See id. 1633c1(A), at 330.
177. Id. 1633c1(C), at 331.
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brand-local when restraint is employed only in that
dealer's locality);178
5. the RPM arrangement covers a powerful brand, meaning
that the manufacturer's brand comprises at least 30
percent of total sales in the product market;
179
6. there is a dominant dealer responsible for at least 30
percent of the manufacturer's sales within the area
covered by the restraint;"s
7. the manufacturer imposes the RPM arrangement
selectively (in only one or a few geographic markets);'81
or
8. the covered product is homogeneous so that there is an
"obvious absence" of any need for special promotional
efforts by retailers because the product is not that
different than competing brands.182
If the plaintiff established that the product at issue is homoge-
neous so that special promotional efforts are not required (the
eighth factor above), then the presumption of illegality would be
irrebuttable and the plaintiff would prevail." 3 If the plaintiff
instead established its prima facie case by showing any of the other
factors, the defendant would have a rebuttal opportunity. The
defendant could rebut the presumption of illegality by showing
that: (1) it has a legitimate business problem; (2) the problem "is
significant in the sense of being nontrivial"; (3) the RPM "is
reasonably connected to [the problem's] solution"; and (4) "any less
restrictive alternative suggested by the challenger is significantly
less effective or significantly more costly."'"
The defendant's proof burden on these four required showings
would differ depending on which anticompetitive concern was
implicated by the plaintiffs prima facie case. 85 If the plaintiffs
showing suggested an anticompetitive concern other than dealer
178. Id. 1633c1(D), at 331.
179. Id. 1633c1(E), at 331.
180. Id. 1633c1(F), at 331.
181. Id. 1633c1(G), at 331.
182. Id. 1633c1(H), at 331-32.
183. Id. 1633e3(A), at 338.
184. Id. 1633e3(B), at 338.
185. Id. 1633e3(C), at 338.
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power, then the defendant would have to prove each of the above
elements by a preponderance of the evidence.18 If the plaintiffs
showing instead suggested that excessive dealer power was the
sole anticompetitive concern, then the defendant's burden could
be lighter.187 The reason for this discrepancy is that anticompetitive
dealer interests, unlike anticompetitive manufacturer interests,
"cannot be served by a restraint that is no more restrictive than
necessary to serve a legitimate manufacturer interest."'8 Accord-
ingly, if the plaintiff's prima facie case suggested only dealer power
as the anticompetitive concern but did not involve a showing of
either high dealer concentration (HHI substantially exceeding
1200) 189 or very widespread market coverage (coverage substantially
greater than 50 percent),90 then the defendant would not bear the
full burden of persuasion on all prongs of its rebuttal.'9 '
The authors of the Antitrust Law treatise deserve a great deal of
credit for proposing a structured rule of reason approach at a time
when Dr. Miles's per se rule presided.'92 The treatise's thoughtful
proposal for separating procompetitive from anticompetitive in-
stances of RPM likely helped persuade many-including perhaps
some current Supreme Court justices-that courts could craft a
principled means of policing vertical price restraints under the rule
of reason. The specific proposal the treatise sets forth, however, is
186. Id. I 1633e3(B)-(,J), at 338.
187. Id. 1633e3(C), at 338-39.
188. Id. 1633dl, at 334.
189. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
190. See supra text accompanying note 177.
191. Id. I 1633e3(C), at 338-39. Specifically, if the plaintiff established its prima facie case
by showing either (1) dealer concentration or RPM coverage "not much above the threshold
of concern" (HHI > 1200; market coverage > 50 percent), see supra notes 174-76 and
accompanying text, or (2) dealer requests or demands for RPM, see supra note 178 and
accompanying text, then the plaintiff would bear the burden of persuasion on the first three
elements of the defendant's prima facie case. 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10,
1633e3(C), at 338-39. The defendant would retain the burden of persuasion on the last
element-in other words, it would have to show that any less restrictive alternative proposed
by the challenger would be significantly less effective or significantly more costly than RPM.
Id. If the plaintiff established its prima facie case by showing such weak factors as a large
manufacturer or dealer market share or the selective imposition of RPM, see supra text
accompanying notes 179-81, then the plaintiff would bear the burden of persuasion on all four
elements of the defendant's rebuttal case. 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10,
1633e3(C), at 339.
192. Volume Eight of the second edition of the treatise, which proposed the aforementioned
approach, was published in 2004. See supra note 10.
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troubling. Besides being remarkably complex,'93 so that courts
cannot easily apply it and antitrust counselors cannot confidently
predict the judgments it will produce, the approach, like the other
proposals considered so far, is overly prohibitive.
Most notably, the approach would automatically condemn mini-
mum RPM on all products a fact-finder determined to be homoge-
neous.'94 The treatise takes this position because it concludes that
product homogeneity "is inconsistent with known legitimate uses of
RPM." 95 But that is simply not true. Although RPM might be used
to combat free riding only when the products at issue are so "distinc-
tive" that point of sale consumer services (such as customer
education about the product) could enhance demand, 196 the practice
could create other procompetitive benefits even if the price re-
strained products were relatively homogeneous. For example, even
a manufacturer of a commoditized product may impose RPM to
encourage dealers to take actions that preserve or enhance the
product's quality but are not readily observable by consumers.'97
Indeed, evidence suggests that RPM has been used to motivate
these sorts of dealer actions (for example, product rotation) on such
homogeneous products as nonpremium (Coors brand) beer. 198 The
approach advocated in the Antitrust Law treatise would thwart this
procompetitive use of RPM on any product that a fact-finder might
deem to be homogeneous.
With regard to RPM on heterogeneous products, the Antitrust
Law approach is deficient in that it would too quickly burden the
defendant to establish the procompetitiveness of an instance of
RPM. In an actual dispute over the legality of RPM, the party
193. See, e.g., supra note 191 (discussing the approach's complicated scheme for allocating
proof burdens).
194. 8 HOVENKAMP & AREEDA, supra note 10, 1633c3, 1633c3(D), at 333-34.
195. Id. 1633c3(D), at 334.
196. See discussion supra Part I.B.l.a (discussing how RPM may be used to combat free
riding on point of sale services).
197. See discussion supra Part I.B.l.b (discussing RPM's use as a device for enforcing
unspecified quality control agreements).
198. See OVERSTREET, supra note 130, at 126 (describing dissertation (Andrew McLaughlin,
An Economic Analysis of Resale Price Maintenance (1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California, Los Angeles) (on file with the University of California, Los Angeles,
library)) as concluding that "RPM was an efficient and socially beneficial method of promoting
dealer services of refrigeration, and product rotation which enhanced the quality of Coors'
unpasteurized beer"); Klein & Murphy, supra note 8, at 280-82.
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bearing the burden of establishing the presence or absence of
procompetitive effect stemming from the instance at issue will likely
lose, particularly when the proof requirement includes consideration
of less restrictive alternatives (the fourth required prong of the
defendant's rebuttal). As the Antitrust Law treatise itself recog-
nizes:
[A less restrictive] alternative can be suggested in virtually
every case-for example, that free-riding dealers can be required
by contract to render the same services as the full-service
dealers. In response, virtually every manufacturer could
plausibly say that monitoring price is cheaper and more effective
than monitoring the number of each dealer's well-trained
demonstrators and the thoroughness and competence of their
demonstrations. Experts can be found to assert either side of the
cost-effectiveness questions. Only in rare cases will the tribunal
be able to reach a confident conclusion. To put the burden of
persuasion on the restraint's defenders is to limit greatly the
practical availability of any defense-which is increasingly
appropriate as the basis for the inference of dangers to competi-
tion becomes stronger. To put the burden on the challenger is to
make a justification relatively easy to establish. 99
Although it recognizes that allocation of the burden of proof on
procompetitive effect will generally be outcome-determinative, the
Antitrust Law approach would place the burden on the defen-
dant-thereby effectively sealing its fate-even absent a showing
that an instance of RPM could give rise to anticompetitive effects.
For example, the mere facts that the manufacturer's market is
relatively concentrated (HHI > 1200) and that use of RPM covers
greater than 15 percent of total sales (collectively, the first factor
that could establish a plaintiff's prima facie case)2" are far from
sufficient to enable RPM to be used as a facilitator of collusion. Yet,
a plaintiff's showing of those facts would strap the defendant with
a proof burden it likely could not successfully discharge. Similarly,
by itself, dealer concentration (the second factor that could establish
a plaintiff's prima facie case)2°' could not render RPM a useful
199. 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1633d, at 337 (footnote omitted).
200. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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device for facilitating dealer collusion; either brand dominance or
widespread use among manufacturers would also be required. °2
Nonetheless, high concentration in the dealer market would saddle
the defendant with the difficult to discharge burden to prove
procompetitive effect.20 3 Indeed, none of the factors that would
individually suffice to make out the plaintiff's prima facie case
could, standing alone, permit an anticompetitive use of RPM. Yet,
a showing of any single factor (except for the fifth, sixth, and
seventh)2 4 would shift the proof burden in a way that would make
it difficult for a defendant to prevail. Like the aforementioned
proposals, this approach would be overly prohibitive and thus overly
deterrent.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Although the structured rules of reason that have been considered
thus far generally call for consideration of the appropriate factors
for evaluating instances of RPM, they are not structured to generate
an optimal separation of procompetitive wheat from anticompetitive
chaff, for each is overly deterrent. This Part seeks to remedy that
deficiency by proposing a rule of reason approach that will both
consider the correct factors in evaluating RPM and allocate proof
burdens in a manner that will maximize the net benefits of RPM
regulation. Subpart A sets forth the general principles that should
determine the contours of the rule of reason applicable to minimum
RPM. Subpart B then proposes a structured rule of reason that
honors those principles.
202. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, § 11.2b, at 449 ("RPM ... can be evidence of retailer
collusion only if 1) the manufacturer imposing the restriction is a monopolist in the retailer's
area; or 2) the restriction is used by a very high percentage of the manufacturers in the
market.").
203. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
204. If the plaintiff's prima facie case were based on a weak showing (that is, a showing
of one of these factors), the plaintiff would bear the burden of persuading the fact-finder of the
absence of any procompetitive rationale proffered by the defendant. See supra note 191.
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A. Principles Governing Rule Selection
Socially optimal antitrust rules are those that minimize the sum
of decision costs and error costs.205 In the context at hand, decision
costs are the costs that must be incurred to reach a decision on the
legality of a challenged instance of RPM. They are a function of a
rule's informational requirements and the ease with which it can be
applied. Error costs consist of the allocative inefficiencies resulting
from wrongly permitting instances of anticompetitive RPM (the
costs of false acquittals) and the efficiency losses resulting from
improperly deterring procompetitive instances of RPM (the costs of
false convictions)." 6 They are a function of (1) the probability that
the proffered rule will reach an incorrect judgment and (2) the
magnitude of loss that will result from that error. In crafting a
structured rule of reason for RPM, then, courts should take account
of the likelihood of incorrect judgments, the magnitude of losses
from various errors, and the difficulty of administering the rule.
1. Likelihood of Incorrect Judgments
To gauge an evaluative approach's chances of reaching incorrect
judgments, courts should begin by considering whether RPM is
more often procompetitive or anticompetitive. Economic theory,
empirical evidence, and retailing trends suggest that procompetitive
uses of the practice will dominate. All else being equal, then, the
governing rule should acquit more often than it convicts.
a. Economic Theory
The preconditions for procompetitive uses of RPM, unlike those
for anticompetitive strategies, are frequently satisfied. RPM may be
used to ensure point of sale services that might be the subject of free
riding whenever dealer provided services enhance demand for a
manufacturer's product and the services at issue are susceptible to
free riding (because, for example, dealers are located within close
205. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 16 (1984).
206. See id.; see also Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A
Decision-Theoretic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469, 498-501 (2001) (explaining error cost
framework).
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proximity of each other).207 RPM may provide an optimal means of
ensuring dealer performance of unspecified agreements whenever
dealer activities would enhance the attractiveness of a manufac-
turer's offerings and the quality enhancing activities are difficult to
delineate in advance or to monitor.2 8 RPM may facilitate entry
whenever a new producer seeks to gain access to or promotion by
retail outlets that already stock and provide favorable shelf space
to well-established brands.0 9 And RPM may be used to stem the
potential price volatility that inhibits retailers from carrying un-
tested goods whenever consumer demand for a new product is
unknown.210 Because these various conditions quite often exist,
procompetitive rationales for instances of RPM are frequently
plausible.
The preconditions for anticompetitive uses of RPM, by contrast,
are rarely satisfied. For RPM to facilitate a dealer cartel, dealers
must seek the policy and the manufacturer must be willing to
impose it. 21' Dealers will not seek the policy if a supracompetitive
price for the manufacturer's product would induce a significant
number of customers to switch to another brand.212 Such demand
substitution would presumably occur unless switching was difficult
because either (1) the manufacturer has market power in the
market for the product subject to RPM, or (2) most of the manufac-
turer's competitors similarly impose RPM. Thus, one of those
criteria must be satisfied for dealers to seek RPM.2"3 A manufac-
turer is likely to comply with such a request (which would likely
increase retail margins, thus reducing the manufacturer's total
sales without increasing its per unit profits) only if the manufac-
turer lacks alternative means of distributing its products. That will
207. See supra Part I.B.l.a.
208. See supra Part I.B.l.b.
209. See supra Part I.B.2.
210. See supra Part I.B.3.
211. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, § 11.2b, at 449-51 (explaining that dealers
must seek, and manufacturers must consent to, RPM if it is to be used to facilitate dealer
collusion).
212. See id. at 449 ("If the manufacturers in the market have no market power, then the
retailers of any single manufacturer could not raise the price of the manufacturer's product
to monopoly levels. Customers would switch to a different brand.").
213. Id. (observing that precondition for dealers' seeking RPM is that either "1) the
manufacturer imposing the restriction is a monopolist in the retailer's area; or 2) the
restriction is used by a very high percentage of the manufacturers in the market").
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be the case only if (1) there is not a sufficient number of other
retailers to distribute the manufacturer's product, or the cost of
switching to those retailers is high, and (2) forward integration into
product distribution is not feasible.214
For RPM to facilitate a manufacturer cartel, the market in which
the manufacturer participates must be susceptible to cartelization,
and the use of RPM must be widespread enough to assist with the
collusion. Anticompetitive harm from the facilitation of a manu-
facturer cartel therefore is unlikely unless: (1) the manufacturer
market is concentrated,215 (2) the product at issue is fairly
fungible,216 (3) there are entry barriers into the manufacturer
market,217 and (4) RPM is used by manufacturers comprising a
substantial portion of the market.21
For RPM to create an entry barrier that effectively forecloses the
manufacturer's rivals from the market, the margin guaranteed to
dealers must be large enough to induce them to drop, or to refrain
from promoting, competing brands. Moreover, the RPM must be
imposed so broadly that it generates significant foreclosure of rivals
(in other words, the rivals cannot have access to other acceptable
channels of distribution).219 Given the ubiquity of discount retailers,
who compete with each other primarily on price and would be
unlikely to forego carrying a lower priced product in exchange for a
220higher margin, these conditions will rarely be satisfied.
214. Id. at 451 (discussing situations in which manufacturers may have difficulty rejecting
retailer demands for RPM).
215. See POSNER, supra note 27, at 66 ("Some degree of concentration thus appears to be
a necessary condition of successful collusion in markets subject to the Sherman Act.").
216. See id. at 75 ("The less standardized (more customized) a product is, ... the more
difficult it will be for the sellers of the product to collude effectively. The heterogeneity of the
orders will make it impossible for the sellers to agree upon a single price for all orders.").
217. See id. at 72-75.
218. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, § 11.2b2, at 453 ('CThe manufacturers' cartel will
work, however, only if its members collectively control enough of the market to wield
monopoly power.").
219. See Elzinga & Mills, supra note 26, at 7 (observing that the RPM-augmented
foreclosure theory "cannot apply where manufacturing competitors and entrants retain access
to the market via competing retailers or alternative channels of distribution. Nor can it apply
where the manufacturer using RPM does not control a large share of the relevant market in
spite of using this practice.").
220. See infra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
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b. Empirical Evidence
Consistent with economic theory, the somewhat sparse empirical
evidence on RPM's competitive effects suggests that most instances
of RPM are procompetitive. In a 1983 Bureau of Economics Staff
Report to the FTC, report author Thomas R. Overstreet examined
RPM's competitive effect by analyzing all FTC RPM cases from
mid-1965 to the end of 1982221 and cataloguing the then-existing
empirical studies of RPM.222 Overstreet's report suggests that most
instances of RPM are not anticompetitive. With respect to the RPM
in the FTC cases, which he took to be representative of instances
of RPM generally,223 Overstreet concluded that most occurred in
markets that could support neither manufacturer nor dealer col-
lusion.224 Although Overstreet provided a more equivocal summary
of his findings from the survey of empirical studies,225 close exami-
nation of those findings suggests that they cannot support the view
that RPM is, more often than not, anticompetitive.226
221. OVERSTREET, supra note 130, at 63-82.
222. Id. at 106-63.
223. Id. at 81 ("[Ihe structural 'snapshot' of the 1950's, comparing fair-trade markets to
all manufacturing markets, combined with our finding that recent FTC RPM cases have
involved markets which structurally are distributed in about the same way as are all
manufacturing markets, suggests that the FTC case sample may provide a fairly reasonable
basis for drawing some limited general conclusions.").
224. Id. at 71-76 (discussing lack of manufacturer concentration in markets in which RPM
was challenged); id. at 80 ("[O]f the 47 cases with data on the number of distributors, over 80
percent involved in excess of 200 dealers. Widespread dealer collusion involving more than
100 (or 200) decision makers seems unlikely to be effective or persistent in the absence of
restrictions on entry ... or some mechanism for overt coordination .... "); id. at 81 (concluding
that "[i]t is unlikely that there is effective manufacturer coordination featuring RPM in all
or even most of these markets" and that "available information also suggests that the use of
RPM is unrelated to widespread dealer collusion in most instances"); see also Stanley I.
Ornstein, Resale Price Maintenance and Cartels, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 401, 431 (1985)
(analyzing Justice Department and FTC cases and concluding that vertical restraints may
have been used to support manufacturer cartels in only 36 percent of the cases). But see 8
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1606f, at 91 (criticizing Ornstein's study).
225. OVERSTREET, supra note 130, at 163 ("Theory suggests that RPM can have diverse
effects, and the empirical evidence suggests that, in fact, RPM has been used in the U.S. and
elsewhere in both socially desirable and undesirable ways.").
226. In surveying the empirical studies of RPM, Overstreet examined price surveys (that
is, studies examining the effect of RPM on consumer prices), id. at 106-19, a number of case
studies, id. at 119-29, two prior FTC studies of RPM, id. at 129-48, and several accounts of
the use of RPM in foreign countries, id. at 149-60. As Overstreet explained, price surveys are
inapposite to the question of whether RPM has procompetitive or anticompetitive effects,
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Examination of litigated RPM cases suggests that most instances
of RPM are, in fact, procompetitive. In a 1991 study, Pauline
Ippolito examined all 203 reported cases of RPM from 1975 through
because higher prices are consistent with both. Id. at 106, 116-17, 160.
With respect to the case studies, Overstreet concluded that "[tlhe probable effects indicated
from the case studies are that RPM sometimes reduces and sometimes enhances social
welfare." Id. at 129. It seems, however, that the reduction of social welfare to which
Overstreet refers generally was not occasioned by facilitation of collusion but instead by the
provision of "excessive" retailer services. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text
(explaining how output enhancing services might be deemed "excessive"). Only two of the
eleven case studies Overstreet examined suggested a collusive explanation for RPM.
OVERSTREET, supra note 130, at 130-40 (summarizing case studies of RPM on light bulbs (two
studies), china, televisions, jeans (two studies), shoes, stereo components, beer, bread, and
various products sold in Rhode Island-finding evidence of collusion in only one of the light
bulb studies and the bread study). By contrast, six suggested that use of the practice may
have been procompetitive. Id. (finding some evidence of procompetitive effect from use of RPM
on china, jeans, shoes, stereo components, beer, and various products in Rhode Island).
The two prior FTC studies Overstreet examined did not conclude that RPM is
anticompetitive more often than not. In the first, submitted to Congress in two parts in 1929
and 1931, the Commission surveyed manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and
economists as to their perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of RPM. Id. at 129-34
& nn. 1-2. The results were mixed. Id. at 134 ("The conclusion which it now seems warranted
to draw from this inquiry is that some advocates of RPM were motivated by efficiency
considerations, and others were not."). The second study, submitted to Congress in 1945,
considered price and volume effects following the imposition of RPM in regions where it was
permitted. Id. at 135-48. Price effects and effects on volume per retail outlet are irrelevant to
the competitive analysis because price increases and reductions in per-retailer volume can be
consistent with procompetitive effects. Id. at 140. Effect on manufacturer sales volume is
relevant, but the data on that point were inconclusive. Id. The 1945 study also included a
detailed account of the involvement of various trade groups in advocating for "Fair Trade"
laws (that is, state laws insulating RPM from liability and federal statutes authorized such
state laws from 1937 to 1975, see Miller-Tydings Act, 50 Stat. 693, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1937);
McGuire Act, 66 Stat. 631, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952); Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub.
L. 94-145,89 Stat. 801 (1975)) and seeking imposition of RPM. OVERSTREET, supra note 130,
at 140-44. The study found that some, but not all, retailer associations were successful at
persuading manufacturers to impose RPM. Id. Given the degree to which some retailers had
taken the lead in seeking RPM under Fair Trade, the 1945 study concluded that the Fair
Trade statutes and RPM were contrary to the public interest. Id. at 144-48. It highlighted
particular aspects of state fair trade statutes that made them particularly useful as devices
for facilitating retailer collusion. Id. at 146-47. Notably, those specific statutory defects do not
exist under the post-Leegin regime, which simply brings RPM under the rule of reason. Id. at
148.
Finally, Overstreet considered evidence that retailer groups in foreign countries had
attempted to utilize RPM to achieve collusive ends. Id. at 149-57. Because he did not consider
possible procompetitive effects from the use of RPM in those foreign countries, this portion
of his report is not probative of the degree to which RPM is generally procompetitive or
anticompetitive.
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1982.227 Ippolito reasoned that the prohibition against RPM was
most strict during those years,228 so one would expect firms to
attempt RPM only when they expected it to be especially
profitable.229 By looking at the theories asserted in the 203 litigated
cases, Ippolito sought to determine why RPM was perceived by
manufacturers to be so profitable (that is, in how many cases might
the profitability of the practice have stemmed from its facilitation
of collusion?).230 Because price fixing is per se illegal, Ippolito
hypothesized that "if the plaintiff had any evidence that the practice
at issue in the litigation was used to support collusion, we would
expect to see horizontal price-fixing allegations in these cases, in
addition to the RPM allegation. '231
As it turned out, allegations of horizontal collusion were rare, as
"[o]nly 9.8 percent of the private cases and 13.1 percent of the entire
sample of cases included allegations of dealer or [manufacturer]
collusion." '232 By contrast, a number of the cases featured character-
istics that were more consistent with procompetitive uses of RPM
than with anticompetitive collusion. For example, up to 65 percent
of the private cases and up to 68 percent of the government cases
involved products for which consumer demand would likely be
significantly affected by the provision of "special services" suscepti-
ble to free riding.233 Approximately 43 percent of the private cases
and 28 percent of the government cases involved products for which
the dealer's role in product quality determination is important.234
And in twenty-four of the twenty-eight "simple good[s]" cases (in
which special services are not as likely to be demand enhancing),
227. Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation,
34 J.L. & ECON. 263, 266-67 (1991).
228. Id. at 266. This was the period after Fair Trade laws were revoked (so all RPM was
per se illegal) and before the Supreme Court decided Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Corp., 465
U.S. 752 (1984), which increased the difficulty of establishing the agreement element of a
Section One violation premised on RPM. See Ippolito, supra note 227, at 266 n.12 (discussing
Monsanto).
229. Id. at 264.
230. Id. at 265.
231. Id. at 281.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 282-85.
234. Id. at 285-89.
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the facts were consistent with the use of RPM to enhance dealers'
sales efforts.235 Based on these findings, Ippolito concluded:
While clearly limited by the information available in the case
opinions, this analysis does not indicate that collusion is the
primary explanation for the RPM-type practices at issue in
either the private-case sample or in the combined private- and
government-case sample .... Based on an analysis of the products
and the types of dealers in the cases, service- and sales-enhanc-
ing theories, taken together, appear to have greater potential to
explain the practices."'
c. Retailing Trends
Trends in American retailing suggest that anticompetitive uses
of RPM are even less likely now than they were during the periods
analyzed by Overstreet and Ippolito. In the last couple of decades,
large discount retailers have proliferated throughout the United
States. Consider, for example, the nation's largest retailer (and the
world's largest company by revenue), Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.2"' Wal-
Mart's domestic retail stores, branded as Wal-Mart Discount Stores,
Wal-Mart Supercenters, Sam's Clubs, and Neighborhood Markets,"'
are notoriously focused on offering consumers the lowest possible
prices, albeit with few retail amenities. In 1970, there were only
thirty-eight Wal-Mart outlets in the United States.3 9 By 1975, that
total had grown to 125, and by 1985, it stood at 882.240 As of 1995,
Wal-Mart operated a total of 2667 domestic units, 241 and by the end
of February 2009, the number of domestic units had grown to
4259.242 And, of course, Wal-Mart faces competition from numerous
235. Id. at 289-91.
236. Id. at 291-92.
237. See Global 500, FORTUNE, June 21, 2008, available at http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/global500/2008/fuUlist/.
238. See History Timeline, http://walmartstores.com/AboutUs/7603.aspx (last visited Mar.
20, 2009).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Those 2667 domestic units consisted of 1995 discount stores, 239 Supercenters, and
433 Sam's Clubs. Id.
242. See Unit Count and Square Footage, http-//walmartstores.com/Investors/7610.aspx
(last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
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other discount retailers that also attempt to woo customers by
offering low prices.243
Not only have the large discount retailers increased their
presence throughout the United States, they have also expanded
their product offerings. Beginning in the late 1980s, the major
national discounters, along with a number of other discounters,
began operating so-called "hypermarkets," enormous retail stores
carrying a vast range of products under one roof, including full lines
of groceries and general merchandise. Thus, large discount retailers,
which compete primarily on price and would be unlikely to alienate
their core customers by demanding that manufacturers set mini-
mum retail prices, have become both more ubiquitous and more
expansive in their product offerings since the studies by Overstreet
and Ippolito. Given these retailers' prominence and breadth of
offerings, most manufacturers confronted with a demand for RPM
from a dominant dealer or group of dealers would have the option
of refusing that demand and distributing their products through the
major discounters' well-established networks.
Thus, Justice Breyer likely erred in his Leegin dissent when he
pointed to retailing trends to suggest that anticompetitive harms
from RPM are becoming more likely. Justice Breyer reasoned that
"[c]oncentration in retailing has increased .... That change, other
things being equal, may enable (and motivate) more retailers, ac-
counting for a greater percentage of total retail sales volume, to seek
resale price maintenance, thereby making it more difficult for price-
cutting competitors (perhaps internet retailers) to obtain market
share.,244
As a purely logical matter, increased retailer concentration may
do many things.245 Justice Breyer's decision to focus on the potential
243. Among the largest of Wal-Mart's competitors are Target Corp., which operates 1699
discount stores (including 245 SuperTarget locations) in the United States, see Target,
Corporate Overview, http://investors.target.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=65828&p=irol-homeprofle
(last visited Mar. 20, 2009), and Sears Holdings Corp., which operates approximately 1400
Kmart discount stores in the United States, see About Kmart, http://www.searsholdings.
comlabout/kmart (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
244. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2733 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
245. It may, for instance, reduce retailer margins as retailers attain productive efficiencies
that accompany increased scale. Cf. MICHAEL BERGDAHL, WHAT I LEARNED FROM SAM
WALTON: How To COMPETE AND THRIVE IN AWAL-MART WORLD 113-30 (2004) (discussing Wal-
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downside-increased retailer efforts to attain RPM-may be a
vestige of the largely discredited structure-conduct-performance ("S-
C-P") paradigm, which held that a market's structure determines
the participants' conduct, which in turn determines market per-
formance.246 Justice Breyer seemed to assume that a more concen-
trated retailer market would inevitably involve greater efforts to
collude. Absent from Justice Breyer's analysis, though, was any
consideration of the composition of the more concentrated retailer
market. Justice Breyer referred to evidence that "the combined sales
of the 10 largest retailers worldwide has grown to nearly 30% of
total retail sales of top 250 retailers,'2 47 but he failed to mention
that the six American retailers in the global top ten are Wal-Mart,
Home Depot, Kroger, Target, Costco, and Sears Holdings (the
operator of Kmart stores).2 4' All of those retailers are vigorous price
competitors, and four of them-Wal-Mart, Target, Costco, and Sears
(operating as Kmart)-have positioned themselves as low-price
discounters. It is highly unlikely that they have the motivation,
much less the ability, to pressure manufacturers to impose RPM,
and their growth and expansion of product offerings reduces the
chance that any manufacturer will find itself without access to
efficient retailers that are willing to compete on consumer prices.
Thus, the use of RPM to facilitate retailer-level collusion is increas-
ingly unlikely.
Moreover, as discount retailers consolidate and gain a larger
proportion of retail distribution, manufacturer-level collusion
becomes less likely. Given the breadth of their store networks, large
discount retailers offer manufacturers especially attractive distribu-
tion outlets. The prospect of tremendous sales through a massive
discount retailer chain would create a constant temptation for any
participant in a manufacturer-level cartel to secure placement in the
Mart's extensive "expense control strategies and tactics," many of which are facilitated by its
scale).
246. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, § 1.7, at 42-47 (describing "the troubled life
of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm").
247. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2733 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing DELOITrE & TOUCHE LLP,
2007 GLOBAL POWERS OF RETAILING (2006), available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/
doc/content/Global%20Powers%20of/o2O0Retailing-07(3).pdf [hereinafter DELOITTE STUDY]).
248. See DELOImTE STUDY, supra note 247, at 7 (listing global top ten retail leaders). Sears
Holdings operates Kmart discount stores. See About Kmart, supra note 243.
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chain by cheating on the fixed price. That temptation grows (and,
conversely, the chance of successful manufacturer collusion shrinks)
as discount retailers comprise a larger proportion of total retail
sales. Justice Breyer thus erred by focusing only on the concentra-
tion in retailing without accounting for the low price focus of the
more concentrated retailers.
It seems, then, that economic theory, empirical evidence, and
retailing trends all suggest that more instances of RPM will be
procompetitive than anticompetitive. The governing rule of reason
should take care not to condemn too many instances of a practice
that one would expect, more often than not, to be procompetitive.
2. Magnitude of Losses from Errors
When the liability rule governing a business practice misfires,
social cost results. If an application of the rule wrongly acquits a
practice that is harmful on balance, the social cost consists of the
net harm from that instance of the behavior plus the future harm
that will be sanctioned by the legal precedent approving of the
harmful conduct at issue. Conversely, when a rule wrongly convicts
a practice that is beneficial on balance, the social cost consists of the
net benefit foregone by stopping the challenged instance of the
behavior plus the future benefits that are thwarted because of the
precedent condemning that type of beneficial conduct.
In antitrust, where the harm from a wrongful acquittal is an
increase in market power, and the harm from a wrongful conviction
is the widespread thwarting of beneficial business practices, these
harms are likely to be incommensurate.249 The harm from wrongful
conviction will generally outweigh the harm from wrongful acquit-
tal. This is true because the harm from false acquittal-market
power-is generally self-correcting by entry or, in the case of col-
lusion, cheating. By contrast, the harm from false conviction-
economy-wide thwarting of a beneficial practice-may be undone
only by a court decision (or legislative or regulatory development)
that corrects the bad precedent.25 °
249. Easterbrook, supra note 205, at 2 ("A fundamental difficulty facing the [antitrust]
court is the incommensurability of the stakes.").
250. As Judge Easterbrook explained:
If the [antitrust] court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits may
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This analysis argues in favor of a rule of reason that, if it errs,
does so more often in the direction of false acquittals than false
convictions. The harm from a false acquittal-approving RPM that
could either support collusion or help to maintain a product mo-
nopoly subject to the perpetual threat of entry-would probably be
less severe than the harm from an economy-wide condemnation of
a practice that encourages output-enhancing conduct by dealers.
3. Difficulty of Administering the Rule
In order to minimize the costs of administration, the governing
rule of reason should focus the liability test so that the parties and
the court know precisely which facts are outcome determinative." 1
In addition, the rule should clearly allocate proof burdens so that
the appropriate outcome is clear upon a failure of proof. The rule
should also provide clear guidance to business planners so that they
can easily assess the liability risk associated with various courses
of action. If possible, it should provide safe harbors for conduct that
presents a very low risk of anticompetitive harm.252 Finally, to the
extent that it can do so without significantly increasing error costs,
the rule should put the burden of production on the party to whom
the information is most easily accessible.253
be lost for good. Any other firm that uses the condemned practice faces sanctions
in the name of stare decisis, no matter the benefits. If the court errs by
permitting a deleterious practice, though, the welfare loss decreases over time.
Monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly prices eventually attract entry. True, this
long run may be a long time coming, with loss to society in the interim. The
central purpose of antitrust is to speed up the arrival of the long run. But this
should not obscure the point: judicial errors that tolerate baleful practices are
self-correcting, while erroneous condemnations are not.
Id. at 2-3.
251. Such focusing will reduce administrative costs by preventing parties from gathering,
and courts from examining, irrelevant facts.
252. Cf. Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688, 1741-
42 (2005) (discussing the value of clear guidance to business planners and reliable safe
harbors).
253. Tension may arise between the need to place the burden of production on the party
to whom the information is most accessible and the need to allocate proof burdens in a
manner that will minimize error costs. For example, if (as with minimum RPM)
procompetitive uses of a practice are more common than anticompetitive uses and the costs
of false conviction exceed those of false acquittal, the burden of proving facts suggesting
anticompetitive potential generally should be on the plaintiff. If, however, some of the
information relevant to determining anticompetitive potential is more accessible to the
1996
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B. The Proposed Rule
In light of the foregoing analysis, a burden shifting regime tilted
somewhat in favor of the defendant would likely minimize the sum
of error costs from false acquittals and false convictions while
keeping administrative costs in check. Under this regime, the party
challenging an instance of RPM would bear the initial burden: (1)
to produce direct evidence of competitive harm by showing that the
challenged instance of RPM had caused a reduction in output, or (2)
to produce circumstantial evidence of competitive harm by showing
that the prerequisites to such harm were satisfied. Once the
challenger had made such a showing, the defendant manufacturer
could avoid liability only by showing that the challenger failed to
discharge its initial proof burden or by offering an affirmative
defense. Such a defense would consist of a showing that the
challenged practice was, in fact, procompetitive. If the defendant
made such an affirmative defense, the challenger could prevail only
if it established that the procompetitive benefits claimed by the
defendant were likely illusory. The following discussion fleshes out
the details of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the defendant's
rebuttal opportunity, and the responses available to the plaintiff.
1. Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case
Because most instances of minimum RPM are procompetitive254
and the harms from a false conviction are likely to exceed those
from a false acquittal,255 the party challenging an instance of RPM
should bear the initial burden to produce evidence that the chal-
lenged practice is, or is likely to be, output-reducing. The challenger
could take either a "direct" or a "circumstantial" approach to dis-
charging that burden. Under the direct approach, the challenger
would produce evidence that the RPM at issue had, in fact, reduced
defendant, administrative cost concerns would call for placing the burden of production on
that party. To determine which concern should govern, the court should assess whether the
enhanced error costs from placing the proof burden on the defendant are likely to exceed the
administrative cost savings. The burden should be allocated so as to minimize the likely sum
of error and decision costs.
254. See discussion supra Part HIA.
255. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
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the manufacturer's output of the relevant product relative to what
it would have been absent the price restraint.2 6 For example, the
challenger could show (1) that the manufacturer's output declined
following imposition of RPM, and (2) that the decline cannot be
explained by other factors (such as an economy-wide recession or
the introduction of a competing product). Given the difficulty of the
latter showing, which would be an indispensable part of a chal-
lenger's direct prima facie case, 257 most challengers would likely opt
to discharge their initial proof burden circumstantially.
Under the circumstantial approach, the challenger would bear
the burden of establishing a significant possibility that anticom-
petitive harm could stem from the challenged RPM. To do so, the
plaintiff would need to show that the factual prerequisites were
satisfied for at least one of the three types of anticompetitive harm
that may result from RPM (dealer collusion, manufacturer collusion,
or market foreclosure).258
a. Circumstantial Dealer Collusion Theory
RPM can be used to enhance dealer collusion only if dealers seek
RPM as a cartel facilitator and the manufacturer, who generally
benefits from the lowest possible dealer margins, complies with
their demand.25 Thus, in order to establish a circumstantial prima
facie case on a dealer collusion theory, the plaintiff would have to
prove that dealers would be likely to seek RPM for collusive
256. Judge Posner has advocated this direct approach to determining whether a vertical
restraint is anticompetitive. See Posner, supra note 80, at 21; Richard A. Posner, The Rule of
Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 18-19 (1977).
257. See Posner, supra note 80, at 21 (noting that this method "requires controlling for the
effects on the firm's output of exogenous factors, that is, those unrelated to the challenged
practice itself," and observing that the statistical methods involved "are not foolproof in
application, nor are they easy for judges and juries to understand").
258. Herbert Hovenkamp, coauthor of the Antitrust Law treatise, see discussion supra Part
II.E, has elsewhere suggested the sort of circumstantial approach proposed here. See
HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, § 11.7d, at 493-95. Hovenkamp's latter approach involves a more
stringent prima facie case than that set forth in the Antitrust Law treatise. Compare 8
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1633, at 328-39, with HOVENKAMP, supra note 39,
§ 11.7d, at 493-95.
259. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, § 11.2, at 448-51 (explaining that dealers
must seek, and manufacturers must consent to, RPM if it is to be used to facilitate dealer
collusion).
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purposes and that the manufacturer would be inclined to honor
their request. To establish dealer interest in RPM as a cartel
facilitator, the challenger would need to prove that:
1. the dealer market is susceptible to cartelization because
(a) it is relatively concentrated, and (b) there are sub-
stantial entry barriers;2" and
2. either (a) the manufacturer has market power in the
market for the price-restrained product, or (b) RPM is
common among manufacturers of that product." 1
To establish manufacturer willingness to comply with a dealer
demand for RPM, the plaintiff would need to prove that it would be
difficult for the manufacturer to resist that demand. Accordingly,
the challenger would need to show that:
1. the dealer or group of dealers seeking RPM comprises a
substantial proportion of reasonably available market-
ing outlets;262 and
2. forward integration into the dealer market would be
impracticable for the manufacturer.26
Absent all four showings, a plaintiff could not establish a substan-
tial possibility that the challenged RPM could facilitate dealer
collusion.
260. This first two-pronged showing is required because dealers presumably would not seek
RPM to facilitate collusion in a market that is insusceptible to cartelization.
261. One of these two showings is required because dealers will not seek to raise consumer
prices through the imposition of RPM if such higher prices are likely to drive consumers to
competing brands of the product at issue.
262. If the dealers demanding imposition of RPM do not collectively comprise a substantial
proportion of reasonably available marketing outlets, the manufacturer asked to impose RPM
(and thereby raise dealer margins) would likely resist that demand. If the requesting dealers
dropped the manufacturer's products, the manufacturer would be able to make up for those
dealers' lost sales by increasing its sales through other dealers. The demanding dealers thus
would have little leverage to demand imposition of RPM.
263. A manufacturer that could easily integrate forward into retailing could not be coerced
easily by dealer demands to impose RPM. One situation in which forward integration into
retailing is likely to be impracticable is when the manufacturer's product is not amenable to
single-product distribution and is more likely to be purchased from a multi-product retailer.
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, § 11.2b, at 451.
2009] 1999
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
b. Circumstantial Manufacturer Collusion Theory
Manufacturers are unlikely to impose RPM to facilitate a
manufacturer cartel unless the market in which they participate is
capable of being cartelized. Moreover, RPM cannot serve as an
effective facilitator of manufacturer collusion unless it is utilized by
the bulk of the manufacturers in the market. Accordingly, a
challenger seeking to state a circumstantial prima facie case based
on a manufacturer collusion theory should have to show that:
1. the manufacturer market is concentrated;
264
2. the product upon which RPM is imposed is relatively
fungible;265
3. there are substantial entry barriers into the manufac-
turer's market;266 and
4. the use of RPM is widespread among manufacturers of
the product.267
c. Foreclosure Theory
The theory that RPM may cause anticompetitive foreclosure
assumes that the manufacturer imposes RPM, thereby guaranteeing
a minimum retail markup on its brand, as a "carrot" aimed at
inducing retailers not to carry or promote rival brands of the
product at issue. In order to make out a prima facie case for liability
on a foreclosure theory, a party challenging an instance of RPM
should have to prove that:
264. Markets containing numerous nonfringe sellers are difficult to cartelize. See POSNER,
supra note 27, at 66 ("Some degree of concentration thus appears to be a necessary condition
of successful collusion in markets subject to the Sherman Act.").
265. Because of the need to adjust consumer prices to account for differences in features,
quality, etc., it is difficult to fix prices on nonfungible products. See id. at 75 ('The less
standardized (more customized) a product is, ... the more difficult it will be for the sellers of
the product to collude effectively. The heterogeneity of the orders will make it impossible for
the sellers to agree upon a single price for all orders.").
266. Because supracompetitive prices attract entry that can render a price fixing scheme
unprofitable, price fixing is difficult in markets with low entry barriers. See id. at 72-75.
267. In order for RPM to substantially facilitate a manufacturer cartel, by either
dissuading cartel participants from cheating or making their cheating more visible, it must
be in widespread use among the colluders. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, § 11.2b2, at 453
('The manufacturers' cartel will work, however, only if its members collectively control
enough of the market to wield monopoly power.").
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1. the RPM at issue was likely to induce such discrimina-
tion against other brands; and
2. the retailers subject to RPM on the defendant's brand
constitute a substantial percentage of the available
marketing outlets for the product at issue.268
The plaintiff could establish the first prong by showing either that
the manufacturer required exclusive dealing in exchange for the
RPM or that dealers carrying the defendant's price restrained brand
generally do not carry other brands. With respect to the second
prong, "substantial" foreclosure of marketing opportunities should
resemble the level of foreclosure required to establish liability for
exclusive dealing, which threatens a similar sort of anticompetitive
effect.
269
2. Defendant's Rebuttal Opportunity
Once the plaintiff produced evidence that the challenged RPM
resulted in reduced output (the direct approach) or that the
prerequisites to one of the aforementioned theories of anticom-
petitive harm were satisfied (the circumstantial approach), the
defendant would have two arrows in its quiver. First, the defendant
could attempt to show that the evidence produced did not establish
the challenger's prima facie case. If the challenger had taken the
direct approach of showing an actual output reduction, the defen-
dant could attack the challenger's evidence attributing reduced
output to the imposition of RPM.270 If the challenger had instead
pursued the circumstantial approach, the defendant could show that
one of the prerequisites to anticompetitive harm had not been
proven. Because the challenger should bear the full burden of proof
on its prima facie case, the defendant would prevail if it convinced
268. See Elzinga & Mills, supra note 26, at 7 (observing that the RPM-augmented
foreclosure theory "cannot apply where manufacturing competitors and entrants retain access
to the market via competing retailers or alternative channels of distribution. Nor can it apply
where the manufacturer using RPM does not control a large share of the relevant market in
spite of using this practice.").
269. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, § 10.9a, at 436-37 (discussing anticompetitive
foreclosure effect of exclusive dealing); id. § 10.9e, at 441-45 (discussing foreclosure levels
required to establish liability based on exclusive dealing).
270. For example, the defendant could show that the challenger failed to account for the
effects of exogenous factors on output. See Posner, supra note 80, at 21.
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the fact-finder that there was a deficiency in the challenger's
evidence.
In addition, the defendant could mount an affirmative defense.
The type of defense would vary based on the nature of the plain-
tiff's prima facie case (direct or circumstantial). To counter a
challenger's direct showing of an actual output reduction, the
defendant would have to produce its own evidence (that is, an
alternative study) showing that its output was enhanced, not
reduced, by the imposition of RPM. To counter a circumstantial
prima facie case, the defendant could show that the RPM at issue
had a procompetitive effect. It could make that showing by demon-
strating (1) that it faced a significant business problem (for example,
free riding on the provision of dealer services, difficulty in contract-
ing over dealer performance, unpredictable demand, a need to gain
new entry); and (2) that the RPM at issue was used to remedy that
problem.271
3. Responses Available to Challenger
If the challenger took the direct route in establishing its prima
facie case, and the defendant affirmatively defended by producing
its own study showing an output enhancement, the task would fall
on the finder of fact to determine which of the parties offered the
more persuasive account. If the fact-finder concluded that the
evidence weighed in favor of the challenger's claim that RPM caused
a reduction in the defendant's total output, then the challenger
should prevail; if not, the defendant should. 2
If the challenger instead set forth a circumstantial prima facie
case and the defendant made the affirmative defense set forth
above, then the challenger would be entitled to one more bite at the
apple. The challenger could prevail if, and only if, it persuaded the
fact-finder that either (1) the claimed procompetitive benefit was
pretextual or (2) the benefit could have been achieved as efficiently
271. This is similar to the affirmative defense set forth in the Antitrust Law treatise. See
8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1633e3(B), at 338; supra note 184 and accom-
panying text.
272. If the fact-finder were to conclude that the parties' accounts concerning output effects
were equally persuasive, the defendant should prevail. The challenger should bear the burden
of proving anticompetitive effect.
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using less restrictive means. 7 If the challenger failed to do so, theverdict should be in favor of the defendant.
C. Evaluation of the Proposed Rule
Few challenges to instances of minimum RPM will succeed under
the proposed rule. A challenger must either (1) produce convincing
evidence that RPM resulted in an output reduction that cannot be
attributed to another cause or (2) first demonstrate the existence of
all the prerequisites to one of RPM's potential anticompetitive
harms and then rebut any claim that the RPM was imposed as the
most efficient means of securing a procompetitive end. These proof
burdens are difficult to satisfy. Still, the proposed rule should deter
blatantly anticompetitive instances of RPM, particularly because
successful challenges will result in treble damages,274 which are not
justified by the clandestine nature of the offense and thus result in
some measure of overdeterrence" 5
Given that most instances of RPM are procompetitive,276 that the
costs of false convictions generally exceed those of false acquittals,277
and that damages trebling for RPM violations already creates a
measure of overdeterrence, 278 the somewhat pro-defendant proposed
rule would seem to strike the proper balance for minimizing error
costs. In addition, the proposed rule would keep administrative costs
273. Unlike the approach set forth in the Antitrust Law treatise, the approach advocated
here would require the challenger to actually prove the existence of an equally efficient, less
restrictive alternative means of producing the procompetitive benefit at issue. Cf. 8 AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 1633e3(C), at 338-39; see also supra note 191 and
accompanying text. This is appropriate because, as the Antitrust Law treatise recognizes, the
proof burden allocation on this issue will likely be outcome determinative, see supra note 199
and accompanying text, and most instances of RPM should be acquitted, not condemned. See
supra Part III.A.1-2.
274. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
275. Damages for antitrust violations are trebled in order to account for the fact that many
antitrust violations (for example, horizontal price fixing conspiracies) are hidden and thus
likely to escape successful prosecution. For blatant antitrust violations-those not conducted
in secret-damage trebling results in some degree of overdeterrence. Because RPM is not a
"secret" business practice, a measure of overdeterrence is already built into the prohibition
on anticompetitive uses of the practice. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 66-68; POSNER,
supra note 27, at 272.
276. See supra Part III.A.1.
277. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 275.
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in check. Because the rule calls for a focused inquiry and clearly
allocates proof burdens, it would be relatively easy for courts to
apply, and the substantial burden the rule places on plaintiffs would
deter frivolous lawsuits. By laying out essential elements of a
plaintiff's prima facie case, the rule creates de facto safe harbors
(for example, no liability on a manufacturer or dealer collusion
theory if the defendant lacks market power and RPM is not
widespread among manufacturers) and thereby lowers the cost of
providing guidance to business planners. The only potential
difficulty, in terms of administrative costs, is that the proposed rule
would require the RPM challenger to produce evidence that may be
more accessible to the defendant manufacturer.279 In the end,
though, the administrative cost savings from reallocating proof
burdens from the challenger to the defendant probably would not
outweigh the increased error costs resulting from enhancing the risk
of costly false positives by making the plaintiff's prima facie case
easier to establish.28 The proposed evaluative approach thus would
minimize the sum of error and decision costs, thereby maximizing
the net social benefits of RPM regulation.
CONCLUSION
The Leegin Court's holding that minimum RPM is not per se
illegal constituted a major step toward an economically rational and
theoretically coherent approach to vertical restraints; however, the
Court realized that the task of crafting a rational evaluative
approach for minimum RPM is far from complete. For that reason,
it exhorted the lower courts to "establish the litigation structure to
ensure the rule [of reason] operates to eliminate anticompetitive
restraints from the market and to provide more guidance to busi-
nesses." '' It also encouraged them to "devise rules over time for
279. For example, a plaintiff pursuing a "direct" prima facie case would have to produce
data on the defendant's total output, data that would be more accessible to the defendant. If
the plaintiff pursued a "circumstantial" prima facie case, it may (depending on the theory of
anticompetitive harm it pursued) have to establish the defendant's market power, and the
defendant may be in a better position to produce relevant evidence concerning the contours
of the relevant market, its share of that market, entry barriers into the market, etc.
280. See supra note 253 (discussing tradeoff between allocating proof burdens to parties
with most accessible information and creating liability test that will minimize error costs).
281. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007).
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offering proof, or even presumptions where justified, to make the
rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive
restraints and to promote procompetitive ones."'282 Courts and
commentators are currently working on this task, and this Article
aims to assist them in their efforts.
Unfortunately, the approaches that have thus far been proposed
for evaluating the legality of instances of minimum RPM are
deficient. Both the open-ended, unstructured rule of reason and
Judge Posner's proposed rule of per se legality are nonstarters-the
former because it is both difficult to administer and almost entirely
indeterminate, and the latter because it is precluded by the Leegin
Court's holding that some sort of rule of reason inquiry is required,
and because it would sanction even blatantly anticompetitive
instances of RPM. The "structured" rules of reason that have been
proposed are all, to various degrees, overly deterrent. If courts were
to adopt those evaluative approaches, the victory achieved in Leegin
could turn out to be largely pyrrhic.
This Article thus has proposed an evaluative approach that would
maximize the net benefits of RPM regulation. Harnessing economic
learning on the potential competitive effects of RPM and the pre-
requisites for those effects, the approach focuses courts on the
appropriate factors for identifying anticompetitive potential and
embraces a burden shifting regime that is aimed at minimizing the
sum of error and decision costs.
282. Id.
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